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SUSAN N. HERMAN*

Slashing and Burning Prisoners'
Rights: Congress and the Supreme
Court in Dialogue

O

nce, legally convicted prisoners were considered slaves of
the state. 1 Like slaves, they were beneath empathy; like
slaves, they could claim no rights. There was no prison litigation.
For a brief period in the wake of the Warren Court and the
civil rights movement, prisoners were viewed as incarcerated
people who shared at least some of the rights the Constitution
confers, and thus shared the corollary right of access to the courts
to redress violations of their rights. As prisoners brought their
complaints regarding allegedly unconstitutional prison conditions
to the federal courts in increasing numbers, the Supreme Court
responded at first by expanding both the substantive rights of
prisoners and the scope of available remedies. Initially, Congress
did not either enlarge or reduce the scope of the rights the Court
was conferring, not even by providing or curtailing jurisdiction or
remedies for violations of those rights. Instead, Congress used its
legislative powers modestly, to direct the flow of this new fount
of litigation.2
But the kaleidoscope shifted again. Prisoners are no longer
viewed as slaves, but they are not quite seen as full-fledged
human beings either. They are portrayed as caged raptors being
treated, at the federal courts' inexplicable insistence, like pets,
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., 1968, Barnard College; J.D.,
1974, New York University. The author wishes to thank John Boston, Stacy Caplow,
Nan Hunter, Minna Kotkin, Michael Martin, and Liz Schneider for their insights and
support, Louis Rasso, Emily Sweet and Wendy Abels for their research assistance,
and Brooklyn Law School for the support of its generous research stipend program.
I Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790 (1871) (a prisoner is "for the
time being a slave, in a condition of penal servitude to the State, and subject to such
laws and regulations as the State may choose to prescribe"). The Virginia courts
declined to even hear Ruffin's challenge to his conviction.
2 See infra Part II.
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squandering taxpayer money on color television sets and Nautilus equipment. The litigation they bring is not generally viewed
as a means of introducing the rule of law into the "dark and evil
world" of prison.3 Prisoners, as the public has gathered from
fairly consistent media coverage, inundate the beleaguered federal courts with frivolous lawsuits complaining about whether the
peanut butter they are served is chunky or creamy. Congress and
the Supreme Court have reacted to this new conventional wisdom by putting their shoulders to the door to try to keep prisoners out of federal court once again.
Both the current Congress and the current Supreme Court
have been "reforming" prison litigation to the disadvantage of
prisoner-plaintiffs, but in markedly different ways. The Supreme
Court has been cutting back previously recognized substantive
constitutional rights, first, during the 1980s, by diluting those
rights, and more recently, in Sandin v. Conner4 and Lewis v.
Casey ,' by creating new pleading requirements applicable only to
prisoners. Congress, unable to reduce constitutional rights directly, has tried to reduce the volume of prison litigation by
squeezing prisoner-plaintiffs out of federal court procedurally.
The recent Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) 6 tries to prevent or deter prisoners from filing federal claims by banning
some litigants and discouraging others. Would-be prisoner-plaintiffs might find themselves denied the opportunity to fie their
complaints in forma pauperis, due to conditions that would not
apply to any other litigants. If they lose their cases, they cannot
be excused from paying costs and may also lose good time credit,
extending their incarceration; however, if they win their cases,
they, unlike all other litigants, will not be allowed to collect costs.
Prisoners must also meet special pleading requirements not imposed on other litigants.7
What justifies this counter-revolution? After the Supreme
3 See Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 381 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
4 515 U.S. 472 (1995).

5 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
6 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996); see infra Part II.
7 Other sections of the PLRA, directed at federal judges more than plaintiffs, limit
the availability of injunctive relief and, most controversially, provide for termination
of existing consent decrees. In many respects these remedial measures are not so
different from some of the measures the Court itself had taken. See Mark Tushnet &
Larry Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologiesof the Antiterrorism
A.7t n,-A
t.l.y Act and the Pr.:-on I1-Ui....for
and Effective Deuih

1, 47-63 (1997). But the provisions directed at individual litigants are novel and
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Court's decision in Romer v. Evans ,8 it seems plausible to ask
whether it is a denial of equal protection to single out one group
of litigants and impose unique obstacles to access to the courts
only upon that group. There are two possible answers to the
question of whether there is a rational and legitimate justification
for treating prisoner litigants differently. The first, the explanation proffered during debate as the basis for the PLRA, is that
prison litigation is different from other litigation. Prisoners, according to this story, have no disincentive to litigate (especially if
they proceed in forma pauperis) and have more than enough
time to do so. Thus, they overwhelm the federal courts with peanut butter cases, and the federal courts, in a state of crisis, need
relief.
The measures Congress took in the PLRA, however, are not
well calculated to reducing the volume of frivolous litigation.
Many of the provisions deter meritorious cases along with the
frivolous, and might not save the federal courts any significant
amount of time or money.9 It is no surprise that the PLRA provisions are not precisely crafted to accomplish these goals, because the legislation was based on myths rather than hearings. 10
Furthermore, deterring frivolous claims by abusive litigants was
not the only goal of Congress. Underlying the PLRA is something that could fairly be described as animus-a sense that prisoners should not be consuming the federal courts' time, because
they are not worthy of attention, except in extreme instances. If
this legislation is inspired by animus (a desire to bar a group of
people from the federal courts because of who they are), Romer
might seem to suggest that the legislation amounts to a denial of
equal protection. The second argument for treating prison litigation differently is that prisoners themselves are different from
other litigants, since they do not share all constitutional rights
equally. At a minimum, they have no right to be free. Is a desire
to punish prisoners by limiting their access to the courts constitutionally acceptable in a way that distinguishes Romer?
It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court will hold the anticonsequential. See infra Part II for citations to and discussion of both types of
provisions.
8517 U.S. 620 (1996) (Colorado provision singling out one group-gays and lesbians-by denying them access to the political process denied equal protection to
members of that group).
9See infra text accompanying notes 199-219.
10 See infra text accompanying notes 194-198; see also infra Part III.B.
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prisoner provisions of the PLRA unconstitutional, for the Court
itself has been confused about the question of how far retribution
against prisoners may go before being checked by judicially declared rights. In Casey, the Court carved its own holes in a prisoner's right of access to the courts, in a manner that might allow
Congress or the states to go even further than the PLRA in keeping prisoners out of court by bringing back some forms of civil
death."
This Article will examine the dialogue between Congress and
the Supreme Court regarding prisoners' rights in the few decades
since the Warren Court suggested that a "prisoner's right" was
not an oxymoron. Part I will discuss the theoretical question of
what rights a prisoner should have and the Supreme Court's varying approaches to this question. This section will describe four
models of a prisoner's constitutional rights (and the concomitant
role of the federal courts), all of which the Court has espoused at
various times: 1) a hands-off model-a judicial counterpart to
civil death; 2) an equality model, where prisoners are considered
to retain all constitutional rights not "inconsistent" with their status as prisoners; 3) an accommodationist model, where prisoners
are considered to share a range of constitutional rights, although
in distinctly diluted form; and 4) an Eighth Amendment model,
where essentially the only right prisoners retain is the right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment. This section will also
discuss the development of the Supreme Court's treatment of
prisoners' freedom of expression and religion, and of prisoners'
due process rights against arbitrary treatment in the prison,1 2
both of which are now measured by standards unique to prisoners. This section will conclude with a discussion and analysis of
the Court's recent renovation of prisoners' right of access to the
courts in Casey.
Part II will discuss Congress' role, which has also fluctuated
over the past few decades. Congress has not always exhibited the
hostile attitude to prison litigation reflected in the PLRA.
Rather, in the past, Congress attempted to solve the problems of
federal court prison litigation in more empathetic ways, such as
the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act. 3 Congress also
attempted to expand prisoners' religious freedom beyond what
11 See infra text accompanying notes 140-55.
12 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
i3 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e) (1994 & Supp. 19,98). SEX ifru Part !. B.
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the Court was willing to protect, in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,' 4 which the Court subsequently invalidated. 5 Curiously, Congress is likely to succeed in effectuating the restrictive
provisions of the PLRA, while its earlier efforts to assist prisoners failed. This reality seems to fly in the face of the conventional
wisdom that there is a one-way ratchet in constitutional law; that
Congress may expand but not contract rights recognized by the
Court. In the area of prisoners' rights, at.least, Congress seems
to have an easy time squeezing prisoners out of court through
process if it believes that the Court has allowed too many rights,
and what may be an impossible time providing additional federal
protection if it believes that the Court has been too stingy with
rights. There is a ratchet, but it goes in an unexpected direction.
Part III will examine the problem Congress claimed to be solving in the PLRA-the crisis of peanut butter cases clogging the
federal courts. This section will discuss the extent to which prevailing wisdom about prison litigation is true, or demonstrably
true. In addition, this Part will discuss how and why the peanut
butter anecdote, which is no more accurate than it is representative, came to be the dominant view of the nature of prison litigation. Finally, a look at recent legal commentary reveals the
noticeable inattention given to prisoners' rights today. In publicity, as in rights, the ratchet goes one way.
I conclude by inviting consideration of what the rise and fall of
prisoners' rights has to teach us about the nature of judicially
declared rights in general.

I
PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND THE SUPREME COURT

A.

The Meaning of Being a Prisoner

There is a certain paradox in asserting that prisoners share the
constitutional rights of non-prisoners, because at a minimum,
prisoners do not share the right to physical freedom. As the
Court has said, "[1]awful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system."' 6 In a more affirmative formulation, a prisoner "retains
14 Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb2000bb-4 (1994)). See infra Part II.C.
15 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
16 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948).
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those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives
of the corrections system."' 7 But these statements beg the question: Which rights or privileges prisoners lose or retain-which
rights are "inconsistent" with the status of being a prisonermust depend on fluctuating theories about the causes of crime
and the purposes of punishment.
When punishment for crime was corporal, for example, it
would have been most surprising for a court to declare that corporal punishment was cruel and unusual, as it would be viewed
today.' 8 Punishment was intended for the body of an offender,
and therefore a right to bodily integrity was wholly inconsistent
with a convict's status.
Michel Foucault aptly described the modern prison as creating
an "economy of suspended rights"1 9 that replaces corporal punishment. But what rights, other than physical freedom, are suspended, can still vary dramatically. For example, in the Quakerrun Walnut Street Jail, the model American penitentiary that
drew Alexis de Tocqueville to America, the ascribed purpose of
prison was to encourage inmates to repent, because crime was
equated with sin and the cure for crime was thought to be located
in the prisoner's own conscience.2 0 Since penitence required solitude, prisons were built to isolate, and inmates were thus allowed
little contact with the outside world or even with each other.
Prisons were monastic in their architecture and in their regimens,
including loss of the freedom of expression and sexual relations.
Expression by inmates was inconsistent with the prevailing goals
of punishment, and was consequently disallowed. Prisoners were
not allowed to speak, except occasionally to their wardens. 2 1 The
17 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).
18 See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (physical abuse of prisoners
by prison guards violates Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment).
19 MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 11 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage
Books ed. 1979) (1977). According to Foucault, this new form of punishment replaced an older form where the body was the locus of punishment, and unpleasant
sensations constituted the punishment.
20
See GUSTAVE DE BEAUMONT AND ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, ON THE PENITENTIARY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES AND

ITS

APPLICATION IN FRANCE

79 (1843)

(photo. reprint 1964); FOUCAULT, supra note 19, at 238-39.
21 See BEAUMONT & DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 20, at 79 (commenting on the
overwhelming silence of the American prison); David J. Rothman, Perfecting the
Prison, United States, 1789- 1865, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON 121
(Norval Morris & David j.Rothman eds., 1995). The Pennsylvania mnode! went so
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competing Auburn model allowed prisoners out of their cells to
work and assemble, but nevertheless continued to prohibit them
from speaking to one another.22 The idea that those prisoners
might have had any sort of right to free expression or sexual relations that an outside agency could superimpose would have been

unimaginable-the notion of such rights was incompatible with
the core meaning of being a prisoner during that era.
With the growth of the social sciences during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and the concomitant view
that crime was at least in part a social disease, the therapeutic
model of prison as a place of rehabilitation was born.23

Criminals were thought to need treatment, not just isolation and
repentance, to learn to avoid recidivism. The sources of cure

would not spring from the prisoner's communion with himself,
but from the prisoner's interactions with "correctional" experts.
Sentences typically allowed an inmate the possibility of parole or

some other form of conditional release, as both a reward for and
result of the cure that was anticipated. In a system where one
important purpose of incarceration was to "correct" inmates and
prepare them for reintegration into society, allowing inmates to
maintain contact with the outside world, including their families,
became a positive goal.2 4

The idea of rehabilitation, or at least the reality of the prospect
of parole, had a profound effect on what inmates were expected
far in imposing isolation on prisoners that they remained in their cells for twentyfour hours a day, and new prisoners were required to wear hoods over their heads
while walking past cells occupied by other inmates. Id. at 117-18.
22 See Rothman, supra note 21, at 117; FOUCAULT, supra note 19, at 237-38; see
also DAVID J. ROTHMAN, THE DISCOVERY OF THE ASYLUM 82-88 (1971) (describing the Auburn and Pennsylvania systems).
23

See generally EDGARDO ROTMAN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT: A NEW VIEW ON
THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS (1990) (discussing the theory and
forms of rehabilitation); FRANCIS T. CULLEN & KAREN E. GILBERT, REAFFIRMING

REHABILITATION (1982) (assessing the twentieth century rehabilitation policies).
24

See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS (1967) (the task of corrections is to build or rebuild an inmate's ties with the community by "restoring family
ties, obtaining employment and education," and "securing in the large sense a place
for the offender in the routine functioning of society").
How far to go in encouraging inmates to maintain family ties is nevertheless a
difficult question. Inmates have been held to have a constitutional right to marry,
see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (invalidating prison regulation requiring
warden's permission for an inmate to marry), but not to maintain conjugal relations,
Irah H. Donner, Comment, Goodwin v. Turner: Cons and Pro-Creating,41 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 999 (1991).
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to do during their prison stays. Inmates needed training or education to equip them to live a law-abiding life after release. Inmates also needed to be treated in a manner that would promote
their rehabilitation by fostering a positive attitude toward society
and to their place in society. a5 Honoring First Amendment values (dignity and the opportunity to participate in the political
and social life of the outside community) as well as due process
values (fair treatment in classifying and punishing prisoners)
within prison walls was compatible with this revised idea of the
purpose of prison. By the 1960s, the preconditions for the judicial recognition of a broader spectrum of rights existed because
most jurisdictions had decided, to one degree or another, to treat
prisoners with respect for their dignity and individuality in order
to serve their own politically determined punitive goals.
B.
1.

The Supreme Court and Prisoners'Rights

An Overview of the Court's Approach

The Supreme Court's initial struggle to define what constitutional rights prisoners retain took place against this backdrop of
a rehabilitative model of prisons. The Warren Court's hallmark
concern with equality led the Court to treat prisoners like other
disempowered minority groups in their need for judicially enforceable rights, during a period when prisoners were expected
to be corrected and rejoin society. The federal courts were to
ensure that prisoners retained rights not inconsistent with their
status, even if prison administrators had to surrender some of
their freedom to decide how to run their prisons.
It is not coincidental that as fashions in punitive theory shifted
(as did the composition of the Court), the Court's prisoners'
rights jurisprudence also changed dramatically. The increasingly
tarnished ideal of rehabilitation gave way to renewed emphasis
on retribution in punishment. a6 Reliance on the use of conditional release was receding. Prison was less often a halfway
house, and more often a final destination. By the 1980s, Con25 See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting)
("Arbitrary actions in the revocation of [parole] can only impede and impair the
rehabilitative aspects of modern penology."); Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v.
Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 486 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Wolff v. McDonnell,

418 U.S. 539, 597 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26 See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE
IDEAL

(1981).

OF THE REHABILITATIVE
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gress enacted its revolutionary Sentencing Reform Act,27 which
sharply reduced the federal system's reliance on parole and probation systems and moved to a system of largely determinate,
lengthy prison terms.
The Court responded by diluting the recently created prisoners' rights. Previously recognized "rights" were subjected to
watered down balancing tests during the late 1970s and 1980s,
with countervailing considerations like federalism and deference
to prison administrators weighing more heavily in the balance.
Two recent cases, however, go beyond this accommodationist approach: Sandin v. Conner28 and Lewis v. Casey29 eviscerated previously recognized rights.
The Court would undoubtedly describe its changing jurisprudence as influenced by a desire to allow the states to select their
own philosophies of punishment, and not by a judicial choice
about the meaing of being a prisoner. To defer to the states on
the question of how extensively a prisoner may be punished,
however, is to select a constitutional standard. This deference
may also result in a race to the bottom, with the political
branches of state and federal government honoring prisoners'
claims to fair treatment, free expression, and access to the courts
only in those limited circumstances where the voting public favor
such rights.
The question of the proper role of the federal courts cannot be
separated from the question of which constitutional rights a prisoner retains. Is the political insulation of federal judges necessary to protect prisoners against overly retributive reactions
fostered by one-sided, unsympathetic news coverage? The
Supreme Court's response to this question has gone through
what may be characterized as four phases. At first, the federal
courts claimed they had no role in overseeing conditions in state
prisons-the so-called hands-off model. Judicial recognition of a
right of access to the federal courts heralded an era when prisoners' rights were treated similarly to the rights of others, an equality model. This model was followed by an accommodationist
27

Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.

§§ 3551-3673 (1994)); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-98 (1994)).
For a brief history of these shifts in sentencing policy, see Norval Morris & David
J. Rothman, The Contemporary Prison, in THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE PRISON
242-44 (Norval Morris & David J. Rothman eds., 1995).
28 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
29 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
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model, where prisoners could claim the same rights to free expression, religion, or due process, but only in a highly diluted
form.3 ° The recent cases seem to have developed a fourth model,
which recognizes few federally enforceable prisoners' rights beyond the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
2.

Access to the Federal Courts: A Hands-Off to Hands-On
Approach

In the era when prisoners were considered to be slaves of the
state, prisoners were civilly "dead" according to the laws of many
states and were not permitted to vote or litigate. 31 Like Dred

Scott,32 they could even be refused the attention of the federal

courts to litigate their own slave status.3 3 Gradually, at the federal courts' insistence that prisoners must at least have a right to
litigate their own status or conditions, state civil death statutes
were repealed or sharply limited.34 Although Congress never
adopted a civil death statute for prisoners,3 5 the federal courts
adopted their own judicial counterpart-the hands-off doctrine.
This doctrine declared that the manner in which lawfully sentenced prisoners, especially state prisoners, are treated within a
jail or prison is simply not the business of the federal courts.36
See infra text accompanying notes 71-107.
Many states adopted civil death statutes modeled after English law, see, e.g.,
Special Project, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV.
929, 949-50 (1970) [hereinafter Special Project], even though some of the conditions
that had given rise to that doctrine in England did not prevail. Because of attainder,
convicted felons in England forfeited their property and thus had little to litigate.
Id. at 1019. Civil death statutes applied to prisoners facing a capital sentence (a
larger proportion of convicted felons at common law than under current laws) to
help the death row prisoner's family settle property matters immediately. Comment, The Rights of Prisoners While Incarcerated, 15 BUFFALO L. REV. 397, 401
(1965) [hereinafter Rights of Prisoners].
The right to sue was considered a civil right, see Special Project, supra, at 1020,
retractable on conviction.
32 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856) (a slave is not a "citizen" and therefore
may not sue in federal court, even to establish that he has a right to be free).
33 Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt) 790 (1871).
34 See Special Project, supra note 31, at 1020-21 (civil death statutes may not prohibit prisoners from bringing habeas corpus or civil rights actions); id. at 1179 (states
were slow to abolish civil death, but eventually most did).
35 See Rights of Prisoners,supra note 31, at 400.
36 See Kenneth C. Haas, JudicialPolitics and CorrectionalReform: An Analysis of
the Decline of the Hands Off Doctrine, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 795 (1977); Ira P. Robbins, The Cry of Wolfish in the Federal Courts: The Future of FederalJudicial Intervention in Prison Administration. 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRiMINOLOGY 211, 213-15 (1980);
Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts:A Critique of JudicialRefusal to Review the
30
31

Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights

1239

The courts afforded complete deference to prison administrators
because of their presumed expertise and because of concerns
about federalism. The consequences of a sentence of incarceration were determined entirely by the legislative and executive
branches of the state and federal governments. The courts did
not set any floor to limit overzealous states or prison
administrators.
Because the question of what role the federal courts should
play is a key question, it is not surprising that the earliest battle
in the prisoners' rights revolution concerned the right of access to
the federal courts. The first modern prisoner's right recognized
by the Supreme Court, in the 1941 case of Ex parte Hull, was the
right to file a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the legality of custody.3 7 The right was narrowly defined as a prohibition against state interference with a prisoner's attempts to
communicate with the federal courts.
Hull, a Michigan state inmate, had attempted to file a habeas
corpus petition, but prison officials refused to notarize or mail his
papers pursuant to a prison regulation that gave prison officials
discretion to decide whether legal documents were "properly
drawn" before agreeing to send them to the designated court.3 8
Hull tried again, giving his petition to his father to file for him,
but prison guards confiscated the papers. By sheer persistence,
Hull finally managed to smuggle his habeas corpus petition to his
father, who filed it for him. The Supreme Court found the prison
regulation invalid.39 The Court stated, "[t]he considerations that
prompted its formulation are not without merit, but the state and
its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner's right to apply
to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus."'' 4 The Court
found whether a petition is properly drawn and whether allegations are properly stated to be questions that only a court may
decide.4 1
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). Prisoners are not considered
wholly civilly dead under the hands-off doctrine, and could theoretically litigate matters not pertaining to prison conditions if those other matters were cognizable to the
federal courts.
37 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
38 Id. at 548. Hull was advised that his papers had been deemed "inadequate."
Id. at 547 n.1.
39 Id.
40

Id. at 549.
41 The Court subsequently applied the principle of Hull to a case where prison
authorities discriminatorily deprived a defendant of his right to appeal to state court,

1240
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The right of access to the courts was subsequently expanded to
prevent a prison from interfering with preparation of court papers as well as their filing. Johnson v. Avery,42 decided in 1969
during Earl Warren's last term on the Court, invalidated a prison
regulation that the Court deemed an interference with the right
to file habeas corpus petitions. The Tennessee regulation in this
case prohibited inmates from helping other inmates prepare their
petitions, a ban on "jailhouse lawyers. '43 In a typical Warren
Court opinion," Justice Abe Fortas considered and rejected the
state's claim that the regulation was justified as part of its disciplinary administration of the prisons. Federal rights supervened,
the Court held, because Tennessee could not show that the
prison regulation had not effectively prevented illiterate or
poorly educated inmates from filing habeas corpus petitions. 45
The Court found it noteworthy that Tennessee offered no alternative assistance to prisoners who wished to file writs.46 The
Court viewed its decision as an additional step to ensure that
prisoners' previously recognized right to file papers would not
holding that even though the appeal was now late, the state must either hear the
appeal or release the prisoner. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206
(1951).
42 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
43 Id. at 484. Ironically, Tennessee advised would-be petitioners to do exactly
what Michigan had prohibited-send a letter to the court stating the inmate's complaint, even if the letter did not meet the required formalities. Id.
44 In an interesting juxtaposition, Johnson was decided on February 24, 1969, the
same day as the Warren Court's major declaration of students' rights in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
45
Johnson, 393 U.S. at 489.
46 Jailhouse lawyers were viewed as a substitute for counsel. The Court mentioned the possibility of providing legal services, or law students, to assist inmates.
Id.
The Court's empathetic view of the problems of would-be prisoner litigants is notable. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, wrote of "[t]he plight of a man in
prison" and the legal problems that might beset him. Id. at 492 (Douglas, J., concurring). This was during an era where law reviews published views of inmates themselves on the nature of the problem. See Charles Larsen, A PrisonerLooks at WritWriting, 56 CAL. L. Rav. 343, 345-346 (1968) (provision of legal services to prisoners
would reduce the number of frivolous claims, sometimes filed because prisoners do
not have the education to tell when their claim is meritorious). It is also notable that
the Court was unimpressed by the state's claim that prison discipline and order
could be compromised if jailhouse lawyers were tolerated. Apparently, the state
could only have defeated the inmates' claim that jailhouse lawyers were a necessary
aid to their exercise of their rights by offering the Court fairly strong proof of their
contentions. Compare later cases, where the Court shifted the burden of proof to
the prisoners tn show that their exercise of a right would not impair the state's interest in order and discipline in the prison. See infra text accompanying notes 74-96.
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become hollow. The constitutional right not to be prevented
from litigating was extended to provide would-be litigants with a
right to obtain appropriate help with legal requirements so that
the courts, exercising the prerogative claimed in Hull, would not
simply dismiss the litigant's papers as legally inadequate. In sum,
prisoners could not be prevented from sharing their legal knowledge-an opportunity they would have had, had they not been
incarcerated.
In 1977, Bounds v. Smith a7 expanded Johnson to ensure prisoners the opportunity to research and litigate their claims. The
Court held that as part of the right of access to the courts, inmates have an affirmative right of access to either adequate law
libraries or to legal services.4 8 Justice Marshall's majority opinion did not discuss the precise constitutional basis of the right,
but instead extrapolated from earlier cases, including equal protection cases focusing on the problems of all indigent litigants.4 9
Another way to ensure that prisoners receive a meaningful
hearing from the courts is to address the court system itself. In a
brief but often-cited per curiam opinion, Cooper v. Pate,"° the
Warren Court required a lower federal court to hear a prisoner's
claim that he had been punished because of his religious beliefs.
The opinion said almost nothing about the religious rights the
prisoner claimed, but apparently assumed they existed. The case
did set a welcoming standard for review of prisoner petitions,
often drafted pro se, instructing the courts to take all allegations
in the complaint as true. The later case of Haines v. Kerner5 1
made the message explicit-the federal courts were required to
generously construe the work of pro se plaintiffs, the usual category into which prisoners fall.
In these ways, the Court declared that prisoners were welcome
in federal court and that their claims-regarding prison conditions as well as legality of custody-would be taken seriously.5 2
47 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
48 Id. This holding imposed an affirmative obligation on the states to provide
inmates with a service that incarcerated people were unlikely to be able to obtain
otherwise.
49 See id. at 821-24.
50 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam). In this case, the prison refused to allow the
prisoner to order religious literature. In addition, the prisoner lost various
privileges.
51 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
52 The Warren Court's hallmark concern with equality emerged in several other
cases that, while not grappling with the nature of a prisoner's affirmative rights,
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The courts were a prisoner's only realistic prospect of redress in

many jurisdictions, for while the Supreme Court continued during the 1970s to guard a prisoner's right of access to the courts, it
also upheld the constitutionality of another aspect of civil
death-disenfranchising the convicted.5 3 Prisoners are thus at

the nadir of political power. Not only are they unpopular, but
they may not even have the clout of being constituents of elected
officials.
3.

The Prisoners' Rights Revolution

It was not until the 1970s that the Court, now under the leadership of Warren Earl Burger, began in earnest to outline which

claims concerning prison conditions were valid. Prisoners asked
the federal courts to invalidate prison regulations or particular

actions that interfered with their freedom of expression (like censorship of mail, or refusal to allow receipt of books), or their free
exercise of religion (including prayer, group worship services, diets that respected religious restrictions, and use of religious para-

phernalia,

including

rosary beads, head

coverings, etc.).

Prisoners complained to the federal courts that they were being
physically abused by guards, subjected to overcrowded and unhealthful living conditions, denied adequate medical care and
protection from other inmates, and subjected to major changes in
their living conditions-in an arbitrary or unfair manner.

With a bench that still included Warren Court stalwarts William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall,5 4 the Court recognized
prohibited what the Court saw as examples of discrimination among inmates on the
basis of their poverty or their race. Several cases held that an inmate's poverty
could not be allowed to stand in the way of petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus.
See Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (state may not validly condition habeas
petition on payment of a $4 filing fee); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192 (1966)
(state must furnish indigent prisoners with a transcript or equivalent record of prior
habeas corpus hearings for use in further proceedings).
In Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968) (per curiam), the Court prohibited
racial segregation of prisoners, despite the state's claim that this practice was necessary to maintain order and discipline within the prison.
53 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974). The Court avoided considering
whether the disenfranchised prisoners were being denied equal protection under
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, on the theory that Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which specifically addresses the franchise, had authorized the
distinct treatment of a prisoner's right to vote. Id. at 42-55.
54 See Melvin Gutterman, The PrisonJurisprudenceof Justice Thurgood Marshall,
56 MD. L. REv. 149 (1997) (prison jurisprudence demonstrated Marshall's convictinn t hat "all nersons. even disfavored minorities, are entitled to the Court's protection of their basic rights").
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rights in all of the areas described above. Rights under the First
Amendment were found to be consistent with a prisoner's status.
Prisoners would have a judicially enforceable right to practice
their religion while incarcerated, even if their religion was unusual. For example, in the 1972 case Cruz v. Beto, over the
newly appointed William Rehnquist's sole dissent, the Court upheld the claim of a Buddhist whose ability to practice his religion

was being hindered because the prison officials were not accommodating his unfamiliar religious needs.5 6 Two years later,
Procunier v. Martinez57 limited prison officials' ability to censor

inmates' correspondence with non-inmates, applying heightened
scrutiny in rejecting the officials' defense that censorship was
necessary to maintain security and order in the prison.58
Treatment of the freedom of expression claim was not markedly different from First Amendment litigation in other contexts,
although Justice Powell's majority opinion was based on the First
Amendment rights of the inmates' non-prisoner correspondents,
which left open the question of what First Amendment rights the
inmates themselves might have.5 9 Prison administrators were required to show that their regulations were actually necessary to

promote a legitimate interest in security and order. Had the
state demonstrated that leaving prison correspondence uncensored was likely to lead to escapes or other serious problems,
that interest would presumably be compelling, and the censorship regulation would be permitted. Applying First Amendment

strict scrutiny to the prison's regulation or actions did not mean
that a prison would never be allowed to censor inmate mail;

rather, it meant the prison would have to justify this incursion on
free expression to a federal judge.60
55 405 U.S. 319, 323 (1972) (per curiam). In Cruz, Justice Rehnquist distinguished
Cooper, 378 U.S. 546, because Cruz did not claim he was being punished for exercising his religion. Because of his status as a prisoner, said Rehnquist, he was "understandably not as free to practice his religion as if he were outside the prison walls."
Cruz, 405 U.S. at 324. Rehnquist criticized the majority for not being sufficiently
deferential to the administrative discretion of the prison officials. Id. at 325. Rehnquist was, of course, right in noting that the Framers of the Constitution would have
been surprised to learn how the Court was interpreting the First Amendment, in
light of what the Framers would have seen as the necessary status of prisoners. See
supra text accompanying notes 18-22.
56 Cruz, 405 U.S. 319.
57 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
58 "Magnify[ing] grievances" was one ground for censorship. Id. at 399 & n.2.
59 See id. at 406-09.
60 Senator Hatch presented this argument in debating whether the Court's later
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During the same year, Wolff v. McDonnell6 1 held that inmates
also had some procedural due process rights within the prison,
and could not be punished for infractions of prison rules without
a fair hearing, including notice of the charges and an opportunity
to be heard.6 2 In other words, lawful incarceration did not retract the right not to be arbitrarily punished.
Perhaps most significantly, the Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment-the only constitutional
right that by its very terms applies to those being punished 6 was found to set an affirmative standard of care of prisoners. If a
state takes custody of an individual and thus disables that individual from seeking medical care, the Court reasoned that it
would be cruel and unusual not to make some form of medical
care available. Thus, in a 1976 decision that paved the way for
judicially-inspired or ordered improvements in prison health care
delivery, Estelle v. Gamble64 laid the basis for prisoners to win
damages or injunctive relief if prison officials were "deliberately
indifferent" to their known medical needs.6 5 In addition, the
1978 case Hutto v. Finney66 found that protracted confinement in
an Arkansas prison's isolation unit amounted to cruel and unusual punishment in light of the brutal conditions in that unit.6 7
Subsequent cases more fully defined the state's general affirmative obligation under the Eighth Amendment as providing prisstandards for measuring an inmate's right to exercise religion were adequate. See
infra note 176.
61 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
62 Wolff also upheld a procedure where prison officials would open, although not
read or censor, mail from a prisoner's attorney. See id. at 575-77.
63 The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a right to
be free from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. According to the Court
in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 nn.16-17 (1979), those who have not been convicted of a crime are not included within this injunction, for they are not to be punished at all.
64 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
65 This case spawned other cases finding a cause of action if prison officials were
deliberately indifferent to inmates' needs in other ways, including protection from
other inmates, see, e.g., Hendricks v. Coughlin, 942 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991), and
suicide prevention, see, e.g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017 (3d
Cir. 1991).
66 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
67 The Arkansas prison was the "dark and evil world" referred to in the earlier
case of Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970). See supra note 3. Up to
ten or eleven inmates were confined in an eight by ten foot cell, sometimes with
contagious inmates, with no furniture, inadequate (and unappetizing) food, and
were punished with a lcather stran and r,,.ctr-lc-l chnr-- tn un-mitiPa hdv narts_
Hutto, 437 U.S. at 682-83.
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oners with "basic human needs" including food, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and reasonable safety.6 8 Like the procedural due
process cases, and like Bounds v. Smith,69 these cases imposed
affirmative obligations on the state that were enforceable, if necessary, in federal court.
The above cases all created prototypes for prisoner litigation.
If prison administrators were found to have unconstitutionally
denied an exercise of free expression or religion, exercised arbitrary authority in punishing prisoners, or failed to provide humane care, federal judges could, depending on the circumstances,
issue injunctive relief or award monetary damages. 70 But lines
still had to be drawn to determine exactly which claims, within
these broad outlines, would prevail, and how active a role federal
courts would assume as guarantors of prisoners' rights.
4. Accommodation
Ironically, just as the Court was promising easier and more
meaningful access to the federal courts in Bounds v. Smith, judicial backlash was setting in. 7' During the next two decades, the
changing Court, now under the leadership of Chief Justice Rehnquist, 72 responded to shifting ideological currents-to a renewed
interest in federalism, and perhaps, in some measure, to the federal courts' own concerns about caseload-and imposed new restrictions on virtually all of the substantive constitutional claims
about prison conditions established by earlier cases. The rights
of prisoners, the Court declared, must "accommodate" the needs
of prison security and order as well as the realities of the pris68 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 198-200
(1989); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).

69 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
70 Federal court involvement with the state prisons grew to be extensive. According to the National Prison Project, three-quarters of the states were under court
order or consent decree with respect to at least some of their prisons by 1996; only
three states had avoided involvement in major litigation concerning prison conditions. See Status Report: State Prisons and the Courts (visited Jan. 1, 1996) <http://

www.erols.com/npporg/status/htm>.
71 See Kenneth C. Haas & Geoffrey P. Alpert, American Prisonersand the Right
of Access to the Courts: A Vanishing Concept of Protection, in THE AMERICAN

PRISON 65 (Lynne Goodstein & Doris Layton MacKenzie eds., 1989).
72 The new Chief Justice had already expressed his doubts about prison litigation
generally in his dissent in Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 325-27 (1972), where he observed that prisoners should not be encouraged to file claims in the federal courts
because they had little to lose and were likely to do so excessively.

1246

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77, 19981

oner's own status.7 3 Respecting the dignity of prisoners faded as
a goal. In its place came renewed sympathy for the prison officials' need to control all phases of prison life. Strict scrutiny was

abandoned.
a. First Amendment Expression and Religion
The First Amendment, it turned out, only applied to prisoners
in a highly modified form. Despite Procunierv. Martinez ," the

Court reversed the burden of proof in prisoner First Amendment
cases. Instead of the usual constitutional norm where the state
must show it has a compelling reason for restricting a constitutional right,7 5 the Court held that prisoner-plaintiffs alleging dep-

rivation of their rights had to prove the state was exaggerating its
claim that a particular prison regulation or practice was a reasonable means of promoting order or security.76 This holding was

one of the first signs that the Court was now seeking a compromise between an equality model (in which prisoners would truly
retain some constitutional rights) and a return to the hands-off
approach. In another departure from usual First Amendment
analysis, the Court also declined to require prison official defend-

ants to show there was no less restrictive alternative means of
serving their goals without infringing upon an inmate's freedom
of expression.77
A decade later in Turner v. Safley,78 the Court confirmed that
the rules would indeed be different when prisoners asserted vio-

lations of those substantive rights not considered inconsistent
with their status as prisoners-including but not limited to the
First Amendment. The Court announced that a general reasona73 Wolff V. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). The Court frequently quoted its
earlier, negatively formulated statement in Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285
(1948), that "lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system," see Wolff, 418 U.S. at 555; Jones v. North Carolina
Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 125 (1977); Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S.
460, 466 (1983), rather than the more positive formulation of Pell v. Procunier, 416
U.S. 396 (1974), stressing that prisoners retain those rights not inconsistent with
their status.
74 416 U.S. 396 (1974). See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
75 See supra note 46 (describing decision in Johnson v. Avery).
76
Jones, 433 U.S. at 128 (citing Pell, 417 U.S. at 827 (ruling that inmates have no
constitutional right to form a "union" to redress grievances in light of prison's concerns about security)).
77 42-, . 7
78 482 U.S. 78

8

(1987).
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bleness standard, not heightened scrutiny, would apply to prisoners' First Amendment claims.7 9 Justice O'Connor, for a divided

court, stated, "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates'
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. In our view, such a standard is necessary if 'prison administrators..., and not the courts,

[are] to make the difficult judgments concerning institutional operations."' 80 Among the four factors the Court described as relevant to this inquiry were whether the inmate had other avenues
for exercising the right in question (a curious mirror image of the
standard First Amendment question of whether the defendants
had alternatives to infringing rights) and the impact that accommodation of the right in question would have on the guards,

other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources. 81 What
appeared irrelevant was whether the prisoner's exercise of the
right actually posed any danger to prison order and security, or

whether it was just a challenge to prison administrators' authority. The Court rejected the proposal that non-dangerous inmate
exercises of expression be judged under a less deferential standard.82 Under the new balancing test, prison officials were permitted to censor inmate to inmate correspondence,8 3 prohibit

inmates from receiving book shipments from anyone other than
the book's publisher,' and deny representatives of television and
radio stations access to newsworthy inmates 85-often on highly
speculative or flimsy claims of security interests.86
79 Id. at 89-90. In this case, the First Amendment claim was the right to correspond with inmates at other institutions.
80
Id. at 89 (quoting Jones, 433 U.S. at 128).
81 Id. at 90.
82 Id. at 89.
83 Id. at 91-93.
84
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989) (prison could prohibit inmates from
receiving books from anyone but publishers); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979)
(same rule limiting access to hardback books for pretrial detainees and short-term
prisoners).
85 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (media representatives may be prohibited
from interviewing inmates); Houchins v. KQED Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978) (media have
no special right of access to prisons under the First Amendment, and so may be
subject to prison administrators' restrictions).
86 Not inquiring whether less restrictive alternatives were available led the Court
to accept asserted justifications at face value. The publishers-only rule, for example,
was sustained because hardback books could contain contraband, even though there
was no evidence that contraband could not be controlled by standard processes of
searching and x-raying. Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 548-52.
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Shortly thereafter, despite Cruz v. Beto,87 O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz8 8 applied the same accommodationist, diluted balancing

test to restrictions on an inmate's ability to exercise his or her
religion. Under this lax test, prison administrators, acting on the
flimsiest concerns about security or administrative inconvenience,8 9 could often prohibit inmates from wearing head coverings required by their religions,90 attending worship services, 9 1
observing religious dietary restrictions, 92 or observing their religions' requirements on cutting hair or beards.93
The shifted burden of proof also meant that although prison administrators did
not need evidence to back up their assertions of need, prisoners needed evidence to
prove that a conceded violation of their right of free expression had left them without "adequate" alternatives. In Wolfish, for example, the Court criticized the prisoners for failing to prove that the methods of getting books that the prison allowed
were "inadequate." Id. at 548-52.
In Pell, 417 U.S. at 823-28, the Court accepted prison administrators' assertions
that limitations on access by the media were permissible because of security, administrative, and rehabilitative considerations, without even discussing what those concerns were, whether they were more than just hypothetical, or whether they could
easily be satisfied by some other means.
87 405 U.S. 319 (1972). See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
88 482 U.S. 342 (1987). See Matthew P. Blischak, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz:
The State of Prisoners'Religious Free Exercise Rights, 37 AM. U.L. REv. 453 (1988),
for a critique of the Court's focus on whether prisoners have alternative means of
exercising their religion, and also for a discussion of the various tests lower courts
had applied to judge prison religion claims before this decision.
89 See Benjamin v. Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571 (2d Cir. 1990), where the court found
the prison's asserted interest in identifying inmates (accepted as an adequate basis
for hair length regulations by other courts) does not actually justify requiring Rastafarian inmates to cut their dreadlocks, because the inmates' hair could be worn
tied back to reveal facial features.
Religion claims, like free expression claims, often involve a prisoner's challenge to
the prison's assertion that certain restrictions are security measures. For a federal
court to rule for the prisoner, in either type of case, the court would have to limit
prison administrators' prerogatives. The religion cases also posed the possibility that
the prisons might be put to the expense of accommodating a religious practice providing a variety of religiously appropriate diets, for example, or assigning additional guards to escort prisoners to a group religious service.
90 See Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1991) (prison's refusal to allow Orthodox Jewish inmate to wear yarmulke was not unconstitutional); see also Friend v.
Kolodzieczak, 923 F.2d 126 (9th Cir. 1991) (prison could reasonably refuse to allow
Catholic inmates to possess rosaries).
91 See O'Lone, 482 U.S. 342 (Moslem religion's requirement of group prayer at
particular times of the day need not be accommodated if guard assignments might
need to be changed).
92 See Kahey v. Jones, 836 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1988) (prison was not required to
accommodate a Moslem inmate's request that she not be served pork and that her
food be prepared with utensils that had not come into contact with pork).
93 See Fromer v. Scully. 874 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 1989) (orthodox Jewish inmate who
challenged prison regulation restricting beard length to one inch had prevailed in the
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Other substantive rights were similarly restricted. Fourth
Amendment protections of privacy and property, for example,
were found to be virtually nonexistent in prison.94 But the new
tests, although posing formidable obstacles for prisoner-plaintiffs,
still left room for the Court to protect rights on occasion. While
the Turner Court held, on a five to four vote, that inmates could

be constitutionally prohibited from corresponding with one another, the Court in that same case, without dissent, applied the
same freewheeling balancing test to invalidate a prison regula-

tion disallowing prisoners with life sentences from marrying un95

less they received permission from the warden.
In addition to raising the hurdles of substantive requirements
almost across the board, the Court talked ever more insistently

about the level of deference federal judges should afford prison
officials in deciding how prisoners' rights should "accommodate." 96 The Court also invited prison defendants to reopen consent decrees if they could persuade a judge that changes in
factual conditions had made compliance more onerous. 97
Tightening the screws in these ways only seemed to affect the
results rather than the volume of litigation.98 The First Amenddistrict court, but the decision was reversed on appeal on the ground that the Turner-O'Lone standard is more deferential to prison officials than the district court
had recognized); Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
987 (1988) (prison could require Lakota Indian, who believed that hair is sacred and
must not be cut, to cut his hair, in light of concerns about prison security; inmate was
free to exercise his religion in other ways); Scott v. Mississippi Dep't of Corrections,
961 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1992) (hair grooming regulation did not violate Rastafarian
inmates' right of free exercise of religion, in light of legitimate penological interest in
identification, so long as alternative means of religious expression remained open).
94 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prisoners have no reasonable expectation of privacy in prison cells that would preclude warrantless searches); Bell v.
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979) (rectal searches of inmates may be reasonable, depending on circumstances). Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), had already held
that eavesdropping in jail cells was permissible.
Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576 (1984), also upheld a ban on contact visits as
reasonably related to security concerns.
95 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94-99 (1987). The Court's discussion of this issue
is quite skeptical of the defendants' asserted interests in preventing the formation of
love triangles, for example.
96 See, e.g., Block, 468 U.S. at 588 (courts should not substitute their judgments
for the judgments of prison administrators).
97 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 384 (1992). See Modification of Consent Decrees, 106 HARV. L. REV. 289 (1992), for a critique of the Court's
new standards for modification of decrees in prison cases.
98 Through the 1980s, the prison docket in the federal courts continued to grow.
See infra note 266.
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ment balancing test reduced a prisoner's chances of prevailing
but did not necessarily make claims easier to decide or dismiss on
paper. What alternative means of expression or religious observation prisoners have, a prison's justifications for its rules or
practices, the potential impact on cost of the practice plaintiffs
advocate, are all fact-intensive inquiries that often will require
hearings or trials. The Court's concern in these cases was clearly

with the federal courts' proper role-and not with their proper
workload.
b.

Cruel and Unusual Punishment

During the 1980s and 1990s, the Eighth Amendment right to
be free from cruel and unusual punishment was also whittled
down to exclude some weighty claims about overcrowding and
brutality.9 9 The new restrictions rejected some claims that could

have imposed significant financial costs on state prison systems,
had they prevailed. 100 New mens rea requirements grafted onto
the Eighth Amendment focused the Courts' inquiry not on what
treatment a prisoner should have a right to expect during confinement, but on whether prison administrators had behaved culpably and deserved to be punished. 10 1 Prison administrators who
99 Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981) (double celling is not per se unconstitutional, even if space-per-prisoner falls below all standards recommended by expert
groups and associations) (see Susan N. Herman, Institutional Litigation in the PostChapman World, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 299 (1983-1984)); Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986) (shooting of an inmate by a guard during a prison disturbance was not cruel and unusual punishment as long as the force was used in a good
faith effort to restore order, even if the guard should have realized that the inmate
was an innocent bystander).
100 Justice Brennan's dissent in Rhodes, 452 U.S, at 356, noted that had the Court
ruled that prisons were required to allocate the amount of space-per-prisoner recommended by most experts, approximately two-thirds of all inmates would be entitled to more space.
The Eighth Amendment prison conditions cases generally involve cost, and not
the additional concerns about prison security and order that are raised in defense of
First Amendment claims. In fact, most wardens would welcome an upgrade of conditions in their prisons. See Herman, supra note 99, at 307-08.
101 The Court added a state of mind requirement to Eighth Amendment claims in
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991) (prisoners claiming that conditions of confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment must establish that prison officials
showed deliberate indifference to prisoners' needs), and elaborated on the nature of
that requirement in Farmerv. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) (deliberate indifference
exists in a case alleging failure to protect inmates only if the defendant prison officials actually knew the inmates faced a substantial risk of harm and disregarded that
risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it, which is a criminal rather
than a civil definition of recklessness).
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remained oblivious to' an inmate's need for protection, or perhaps even well-intentioned wardens who lacked adequate funding to maintain clean and safe institutions, now had a new
defense against inmates' claims for minimally adequate treatment-a lack of mens rea.
Although the new law reduced a prisoner's prospects of winning lawsuits, it did not reduce the volume of cases. 10 2 Determining the extent of a warden's knowledge demands credibility
assessments, not decision on motion papers. The Eighth Amendment continued to be the most fertile source of prisoner civil
rights actions. 10 3 It is also noteworthy that during the. same era,
the Court resisted imposing other limitations on Eighth Amendment claims, holding for example, that prisoners alleging they
had been brutalized by guards did not need to plead that they
had been seriously injured in order to state an Eighth Amendment claim.'0 4 In another case, the Court held that a prisoner
asserting his health was being threatened by exposure to his
cellmate's heavy cigarette smoking need not wait until he became
ill to raise a claim under the Eighth Amendment. 10 5 Had the
Court imposed the new pleading requirements desired by prison
administrators, the caseload might have been reduced. However,
this goal did not seem to be a top priority for the Court.
Although the deck was being stacked against prisoner-plaintiffs a
bit more, the Court continued to acknowledge federal court responsibility for prisoners' health and welfare.
c.

ProceduralDue Process

In other areas of the law change was more radical. During the
late 1970s and 1980s, procedural due process protections were
102 In fact, the standard imposed by Rhodes, 452 U.S. 337, substitutes a fact-intensive "totality of the conditions" test for what might have been an objective referent-the amount of space per prisoner regarded by experts as humane-thus
inviting extensive litigation about the conditions in each facility.
103 See Howard B. Eisenberg, Rethinking PrisonerCivil Rights Cases and the Provision of Counsel, 17 S. ILL. U. L.J. 417, 457 (1993) (author's study showing that

complaints stating causes of action under the Eighth Amendment represented from
over half to two-thirds of the prisoner civil rights complaints filed in three federal
districts during the period studied, while religion claims did not amount to more
than two percent of complaints filed).
104 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992) (prison guards' use of excessive force
against an inmate may be actionable cruel and unusual punishment even if the prisoner did not sustain any serious physical injury).
105 Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25 (1993) (exposure to secondary smoke might
be cruel and unusual punishment).
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10 6
doled out in an increasingly stingy manner. Meachum v. Fano
emphasized that a lawfully incarcerated prisoner could be housed
in any prison, or be transferred from prison to prison without any
process at all. Under this theory, prisoners could be transferred
to distant prisons, even for punitive reasons, or placed in restrictive housing units without any hearing or reasons, as long as the
laws or regulations of their jurisdiction had not conferred rights
10 7
upon them.
It was not until the recent case of Sandin v. Conner"°8 that the
Supreme Court took dramatic measures to impose a special burden on prisoners litigating due process claims. After this decision, prisoner procedural due process claims are as different from
the due process claims of others as their First Amendment
claims. Together with Lewis v. Casey,"°9 this case represents a
dramatically revised approach to prisoners' rights cases not
brought under the Eighth Amendment. Conner is also one of
the first cases in which the Court seems to gerrymander prisoners' rights in order to reduce federal court caseload.

5. From Revolution to Rout
a.

Sandin v. Conner-The Newer Liberty

The Supreme Court's decision in Conner clearly changed the
law regarding a prisoner's right to a fair decision-making process,
but the extent of that change remains unclear. If the Court's
chief objective was to save the federal courts time in dealing with
prisoner due process claims, it may not yet have achieved that
goal. If its goal was simply to make litigation more difficult for
prisoner-plaintiffs, however, it has certainly succeeded. The federal courts are now on notice that they should be unsympathetic
to most prisoner due process claims, although it is not yet clear
what form that lack of sympathy should take.
106 427 U.S. 215 (1976).

Cases during the late 1970s and 1980s restricted both (1) the predicate for
procedural due process protections, see, e.g., id. (intrastate prison transfer does not
involve a liberty interest, and therefore requires no due process unless state statutory or regulatory law creates an entitlement; Massachusetts law did not create an
entitlement); Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454 (1989) (no
liberty interest in visitation procedures), and (2) the scope of procedural protection
required if a liberty interest had been found, see, e.g., Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460
(1983) (entitlement to due process before confinement in administrative segregation
requires only minimal due process).
107

108 515 U.S. 472 (1995).
109 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
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Pre-Sandin v. Conner Rights

In the several decades before Conner, the Supreme Court
struggled to define when a prisoner could claim a right to procedural protections before being deprived of liberty." ° Prisoners
are uniquely subject to conferrals and deprivations of freedom:
they may be granted or denied parole, have their parole revoked,
be transferred to a harsher prison or a more restrictive housing
unit within their own prison, be denied furloughs or work release
status, or be denied visitation rights. There is usually no substantive question about the state's power to limit a prisoner's freedom in these ways. As the Court noted in Meachum v. Fano,i n a
lawful conviction gives the state power to decide how harshly to
punish the convicted individual, subject only to the constraints of
the Eighth Amendment (punishment cannot be cruel and unusual) and the requirements of procedural due process (deprivations of liberty must be accompanied by appropriate
procedures). To determine what process was due, the Court used
the same methodology it applied to non-prisoner claims regarding deprivation of liberty or property.
In Morrissey v. Brewer," 2 a 1972 case at the beginning of the
prisoners' rights explosion, the Court held that parolees could
not be reincarcerated without a careful hearing to decide
whether or not the jurisdiction's criteria for parole revocation
had actually been satisfied, because reincarceration after life on
parole constituted a "grievous loss" of liberty. The Court has
continued to insist that decisions about whether or not freed pris1 13
oners are to be reincarcerated must be carefully scrutinized. '
Decisions affecting the freedom of those still within prison
walls, on the other hand, have not always commanded as much
110 See generally Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The ProceduralDue Process
Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 482

(1984).
111 427 U.S. 215, 225 (1976) (transfer to a more secure institution, like initial assignment to that institution, is "within the normal limits or range of custody which
the conviction has authorized the State to impose").
112 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).

113 See, e.g., Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143 (1997) (early release program, characterized by Oklahoma as merely a different form of custody, in fact created a liberty
interest that required a parole revocation hearing before Oklahoma could reincarcerate a released person); Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997) (inmate was
"punished" within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto Clause by being reincarcerated
under an early release program devised subsequent to his sentencing).
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sympathy from the Court. In 1974, Wolff v. McDonnell 1 4 provided that if inmates were deprived of "liberty" within the mean-

ing of the Due Process Clause-punished at a disciplinary
hearing by losing good time credit (affecting the date of their release)-they were entitled to notice, an opportunity to be heard,
the right to present evidence at the disciplinary proceeding, and a
written statement of reasons for the decision reached.1 1 5 The
later cases, addressing decisions to assign prisoners to harsher
prisons"' or administrative segregation units,1 17 and even to
deny parole,1 18 applied an overtly positivist approach to determine when a prisoner is deprived of "liberty" within the meaning
of the Due Process Clause, theorizing that freedom is to constitu-

tionally protected "liberty" as wealth is to "property." Stateguaranteed expectations of liberty are equivalent to state-guaranteed expectations in property. Adopting the Board of Regents v.
9 two-part test, the Wolff Court ruled that prisoners generRoth 11

ally have no right to due process in decisions affecting their freedom unless the state has created a liberty interest by providing
120
criteria or by limiting the discretion of the decision-maker.
Later cases applied this positivist test in a highly formalistic manner, scanning the language of the statute or regulation for

mandatory language restricting discretion, such as "must" instead
of "may. "121
114 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
115 The Court also suggested that similar procedures would be required "when
solitary confinement is at issue" because such confinement represents a major
change in the conditions of confinement. Id. at 571 n.19.
116 Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215 (1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236
(1976).
117 Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460 (1983).
118 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1
(1979).
119408 U.S. 564 (1972).

120 See, e.g., Meachum, 427 U.S. at 228 (state officials had discretion to transfer
prisoners to other facilities "for whatever reason or for no reason at all" and therefore no liberty interest existed); Hewitt, 459 U.S. at 471-72 (liberty interest is created
by regulations requiring that "administrative segregation will not occur absent specified substantive predicates").
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980), declared that there is a limit to positivist analysis. Where a state transferred a prisoner from a prison to a mental hospital for
involuntary treatment, the Court held that the prisoner was entitled to careful procedures surrounding that decision, regardless of how the state characterized its decision-making process, because the new facility was "qualitatively different" and had
"stigmatizing consequences." Id. at 493-94.
121 .Cee Hewitt. 459 U.S. at 471-72 (questioning whether state guidelines had used
"language of an unmistakably mandatory character" in providing that deprivation
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The positivist approach always reeked of compromise. Before
Conner, the Court declined to look at the nature of the interest

(denial of parole, for example, or transfer to a distant prison
where the prisoner's family would be unable to visit) 122 in deciding whether any process was due. This doctrine therefore allowed the state to inflict grievous losses of freedom with no due

process at all. Not only was a hearing not required for a decision
not affecting a "liberty interest," but the state was not even compelled to provide reasons or an unbiased decision-maker. On the
other hand, if a liberty interest was created, prisoners were not at
the mercy of careless or vindictive deprivations of even small
regularity,
freedoms. The Court sometimes required procedural
1 23
needed.
most
was
it
when
always
not
although
(ii)

Sandin v. Conner's New Pleading Requirement

In Conner,'2 4 the Court recognized some of the above flaws
but showed little inclination to abandon or modify the positivist
approach to procedural issues generally, or even to procedural
issues concerning all deprivations of liberty. Noting that the
word-bound approach allowed recognition of trivial losses of
freedom as liberty interests entitled to due process protection,
the Court suggested that this problem is endemic in prison litigation, and the Court therefore created special rules applying only
would not occur "absent specified substantive predicates"); Kentucky Dep't of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461, 464-65 (1989) (existence of liberty interests
is determined by a close examination of the language of the relevant statutes and
regulations).
122 Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238 (1983) (transfer of a Hawaiian prisoner to a
prison on the mainland).
123 The positivist approach also has other drawbacks. Constitutional requirements differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, depending on how a particular jurisdiction describes its parole or transfer policy, and jurisdictions are encouraged to avoid
the courts' imposition of procedure in the only way they can-by retaining the authority to act arbitrarily, thereby avoiding creating a liberty interest.
The Court has been tempted to avoid burdening states that have created liberty
interests, by requiring only minimal procedure in the second part of the two-step
analysis. An approach focusing on the content of each jurisdiction's statutes and
regulations also requires extensive litigation. Generally, at least one case has to be
decided in each jurisdiction as to each program before anyone can be sure whether a
liberty interest in parole release, for example, exists. Ironically, under the positivist
approach, the federal courts offer relief only to those inmates whose states have
already conferred something like a right upon them (and who therefore might well
have an opportunity to seek relief in state court), and no relief to those whose states
reserved the right to be arbitrary. See Herman, supra note 110.
124 See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) (Hewitt approach creates disincentives for states to codify procedures).
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to prisoners. Chief Justice Rehnquist chose trivial examples of
prisoner procedural due process cases, such as one prisoner's
claim of entitlement to a tray instead of a sack lunch,12 5 and another's demand for a cell with an electrical outlet. 126 However,
the plaintiff, Conner, had actually raised the less trivial claim the

Court had described sympathetically in Wolff-he had been sentenced to thirty days in a special housing unit after a disciplinary
proceeding that he claimed did not satisfy the procedural re-

quirements set forth in Wolff.
In a five to four decision, the Court sought to reduce the
number of trivial procedural due process cases by simply adding
a new pleading element that apparently applies only to prison
due process claims: prisoners must show they have suffered an
"atypical and significant hardship ...in relation to the ordinary
incidents of prison life.' 1 27 This new requirement is clearly an
extension of the hands-off reasoning of Meachum.128 The Court
stated, "[d]iscipline by prison officials in response to a wide range
of misconduct falls within the expected perimeters of the sentence imposed by a court of law.' 129 Prison litigation is qualitatively different from other due process litigation, according to the
Court, because prison administrators need freedom to run secure
prisons. Chief Justice Rehnquist complained that the positivist
approach of the Hewitt v. Helms line of cases involved the federal courts in the day-to-day management of prisons. 30 The
Court further explained that prison litigation is also different be125 Burgin v. Nix, 899 F.2d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 1990). The inmate actually challenged his reclassification as an "incorrigible inmate" without any notice or hearing.
One of the consequences of the reclassification was that he received sack instead of
tray lunches. Invoking the positivist test, the court of appeals concluded that arbitrary treatment in these circumstances was allowable because the wording of the
relevant state laws did not create an entitlement.
126 Lyon v. Farrier, 727 F.2d 766, 768-69 (8th Cir. 1984) (both district court and
court of appeals held that no liberty interest was created by a state regulation that
rather vaguely provided that an inmate's procedural rights would depend on the
gravity of the loss involved).
It is somewhat misleading to characterize the prisoner's claim as one of entitlement to an electrical outlet. The plaintiff, who was suspected of planning an escape,
was transferred to a less comfortable cell and punished in a variety of ways (loss of
prison job, etc.) that the defendants claimed were inadvertent. It was also the allegedly arbitrary change of status in this case, along with its consequences, that the
inmate challenged. See id. at 766-68.
127 Conner, 515 U.S. at 484.
128 427 U.S. 215 (1975). See supra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
129 Conner, 515 U.S. at 485.
00U Id. at 482-83.
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cause prisoners tend to bring many lawsuits, many of which are
frivolous. Allowing state prisons to punish inmates in ways that
are not "atypical" or "significant hardships" allows more flexibility to the prisons and also reduces the number of cases in the
federal courts. Thus, the right to have decisions curtailing one's
freedom made fairly and carefully, unless those decisions are
both "atypical and significant," becomes one of the rights retracted upon conviction.
(iii) The Practical Effects of Sandin v. Conner
Conner created more questions than it answered. The Court
substituted a fact-intensive inquiry to determine what constitutes
an atypical and significant deprivation, for the law-oriented inquiry that considers the applicable law or regulation. It is clear
the Court intended to preclude de minimis claims about tray
lunches and electrical outlets that could only have seemed plausible under a formalistic, word-bound approach. (Those claims, of
course, did not often succeed regardless of the approach.) It is
unclear, however, whether the Court intended this new test to
supplant or supplement the positivist test. 131 Left unanswered is
whether atypical and significant deprivations of freedom are always actionable, or actionable only if the state also has limited
discretion with respect to its decision-making process.
Conner's new test is not a return to a grievous loss test, because deprivations of freedom must be not only significant, but
also "atypical." What does "atypical" mean? According to the
majority, Conner's sentence to disciplinary segregation was not
atypical because it was "within the range of confinement to be
normally expected for one serving an indeterminate term of
[thirty] years to life."' 32 Is this an empirical finding that the average prisoner in Conner's jurisdiction serving a sentence of that
See id. at 496-501 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (urging courts to continue using the
positivist approach in deciding whether claims within a middle category--claims not
so trivial as to be de minimis, nor so serious and atypical as to win protection under
the Due Process Clause itself, as in Vitek v. Jones-give rise to liberty interests);
Arce v. Walker, 139 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 1998); Samuels v. Mockry, 77 F.3d 34, 37-38
(2d Cir. 1996) (questioning whether Conner confers a liberty interest on an inmate
who would not have had one under the positivist analysis of Hewitt v. Helms); Jones
v. Moran, 900 F. Supp. 1267, 1274 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (adopting Justice Breyer's suggestion and using Conner as a threshold test added to the Hewitt method of gauging
liberty interests).
132 Conner, 515 U.S. at 487.
131
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length will be sentenced to thirty days in a segregated housing

unit?
What does "significant" mean? The Court found that Conner
had not really suffered much cognizable injury for two reasons.
First, conditions in the punitive housing unit were not very different from conditions in the administrative segregation unit, to
which Conner might have been assigned without a finding of mis-

conduct. Second, Conner's chances of parole were not likely to
have been affected by the finding of misconduct because the state
expunged the record of the more serious charge, and also because the state code did not "require" the parole board to deny

parole in the face of a misconduct record or to grant parole in its
absence. 133 Thus, although Conner's punishment did have a significant impact on the conditions of his incarceration, 3 he was
not deprived of "liberty" within the meaning of the Due Process
Clause, and therefore had no right to call witnesses or to receive

any form of fair treatment. After this decision, there are more
occasions in which an inmate in Conner's position could be sent

to a punitive segregation unit (or presumably a more restrictive
prison) in disregard of the state's own statutes or regulations,
without justification, for vindictive reasons, or by a biased decision-maker, and the federal courts would presumably refuse to
hear his claim. Arbitrary state action not meeting the Conner
requirements would now be unconstitutional, effectively, only if
135
it amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.
133 Note the Court's adherence to tenets of positivist analysis. If the parole board
had discretion to deny parole on the basis of a procedurally flawed finding of misconduct, the Court finds nothing constitutionally wrong. Due process violations
arise only if the parole board is bound by mandatory language.
The dissent pointed out, with respect to the first argument, that finding that Conner had no liberty interest because the state expunged the record after the fact
seems like backwards reasoning. Id. at 489 n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 50102 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissenters also contended that although Conner
should have been found to have a liberty interest, had this case been remanded to
the district court, defendants would have been sure to win a summary judgment
motion because Conner had not shown that he had been denied any procedural right
afforded him by Wolff. Id. at 491 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 503-04 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
134 According to Justice Breyer's description, in general population, Conner
would have spent eight hours a day out of his cell at work or at classes; in disciplinary segregation, he spent less than one hour a day out of his cell, for brief exercise
or shower periods, during which he was isolated and shackled. Id. at 494 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
135 Id. at 487-88 n.l. Some claims might also be cognizable under the First
Amendment, see Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802 (9th Cir. 1995) (claim of pu.:shment
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The dissenters aptly complained that the majority left "con-

sumers of the Court's work at sea, unable to fathom what would
constitute an 'atypical, significant deprivation'.... "136 The lower
courts that have considered procedural due process cases since
Conner have indeed had considerable difficulty deciding who has
suffered an atypical and significant deprivation. 1 37 Further
in retaliation for exercise of First Amendment rights not precluded by Conner), or
the Equal Protection Clause, if treatment were racially discriminatory. The Court
also noted that inmates can use internal prison grievance procedures and state judicial review "where available." Conner, 515 U.S. at 487-88. Most states never developed grievance procedures that met minimal federal standards. See infra text
accompanying note 172.
One district judge complained that Conner's result
effectively treats wrongful commitment to segregation as an inherent consequence, a sort of assumed risk, of being in prison to begin with-strikes
this Court as one more befitting a totalitarian regime than our own, and it
is hard to credit that outcome as flowing from a principled Supreme Court
decision.
Leslie v. Doyle, 896 F. Supp. 771, 774 (N.D. Ill. 1995), affd, 125 F.3d 1132 (7th Cir.
1997).
136 Conner, 515 U.S. at 490 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
137 For typical complaints about the decision's lack of clarity see Justice v. Coughlin,
941 F. Supp. 1312, 1317 (N.D.N.Y. 1996), stating that the decision does not
"completely clarify the parameters of prison due process analysis"; Zamakshari v.
Dvoskin, 899 F. Supp. 1097, 1106 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), stating that the impact of the
decision is "unclear"; and Knox v. Lanham, 895 F. Supp. 750, 759 (D. Md. 1995),
stating that it is unclear whether atypicality should be judged from an objective perspective or the subjective perspective of inmates in the particular classification of
plaintiff. Not surprisingly, lower courts have provided a confounding array of answers to these questions, and have discovered that some of the questions spawn
many additional questions.
Some courts have tried to apply a bright line rule to judge typicality. For example,
if 30 days of segregation is not atypical and significant, then perhaps 60 days, see,
e.g., Zamakshari, 899 F. Supp. at 1108 (60 days found not atypical and significant),
or six months would be, see, e.g., Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 (7th Cir.
1995) (remanding for determination of whether six month segregation was atypical
and significant); Acker v. Maxwell, No. 94-17169, 1995 U.S. App., LEXIS 27455, at
*1 (9th Cir. July 17, 1995) (same). What about one year, see, e.g., Williams v. Fountain, 77 F.3d 372, 374 n.3 (11th Cir. 1996) (assuming one year of solitary confinement
is atypical and significant); Lee v. Coughlin, 26 F. Supp. 2d 615, 632-34 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (376 days was atypical and significant), or three years? Some courts consider
the ratio of the segregation to the entire prison sentence. See, e.g., Arce v. Coughlin, No. 93C1V4702, 1996 WL 252371, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 14, 1996) (citing cases);
Walker v. Mahoney, 915 F. Supp. 548, 553 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (concluding 23 day segregation is not atypical and significant, but would be if imposed during a two month
sentence). Some consider the potential penalty that could have been imposed at the
disciplinary hearing in determining the need for due process, rather than the penalty
actually imposed. See Coughlin, 941 F. Supp. at 1322-23; Campo v. Keane, 913 F.
Supp. 814, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Another issue is whether the court considering each inmate's claim of "significance" should hold a hearing to determine the nature of conditions in the segregated
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Supreme Court litigation is needed to understand how great a
step the Court is taking in the direction of removing federal constitutional guarantees of fairness from decisions respecting prisoners, and thus redefining what it means to be a prisoner.' 38
housing unit and how they differ from conditions in general population, see, e.g.,
Cannistraci v. Van Der Veur, No. 96-4069, 1997 WL 31549, at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 27,
1997) (remanding for factfinding on whether 30 days in segregation unit and a $200
fine constitute "atypical and significant deprivation"); Kennedy v. Blankenship, 100
F.3d 640, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1996) (holding demotion from administrative to punitive
segregation not atypical and significant); Jones v. Kelly, 937 F. Supp. 200, 202
(W.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding 191 days assignment to special housing unit was not atypical and significant under circumstances); cf. Frazier v. Coughlin, 81 F.3d 313, 317 (2d
Cir. 1996) (concluding the district court had done "extensive factfinding," so claim
could be measured against Conner's), the impact of those conditions on the individual prisoner, see Delaney v. Selsky, 899 F. Supp. 923, 1927-28 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)
(plaintiff confined to segregated housing unit for 197 days-a period that might not
otherwise have been atypical and significant-did suffer a deprivation of liberty because of his unusual height in relation to the size of his bed in segregation), whether
the prison had discretion to impose similar conditions with no substantive predicate,
and what impact the ruling had or might have on future custody-related decisions
like parole, see generally Hemphill v. Delo, 105 F.3d 391, 392 (8th Cir. 1997) (need
for factual development precludes possibility of summary judgment); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447 (9th Cir. 1996) (same). Will a finding for the prisoner on any one
of the above bases (Conner lost on all) lead to a finding that the deprivation was
"significant," or will more than one factor be required?
Another issue is whether a court considering a claim of "atypicality" need hear
testimony on how often such assignments are made in that prison or jurisdiction.
See, e.g., Jones v. Moran, 900 F. Supp. 1267, 1273 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (conditions in
particular state's prison system must be considered). If a prison may impose any
punishment, no matter how serious, as long as it is not "atypical," the test seems to
allow the prison opportunities for shameless bootstrapping. The prison may do
whatever the prison typically does. Or, is it possible that this test freezes what is
typical or atypical at the time of the Conner decision and prevents a prison from
using self help to defeat procedural claims? Perhaps a jurisdiction's practices should
be compared to other jurisdictions for typicality, an approach that would avoid bootstrapping but that would also cut against the federalist model Congress and the
Court value.
138 The Conner decision clearly does have some limits. The additional requirement poses an obstacle for inmates who suffer losses of freedom while in prison, but
not for those whose length of custody is affected by deprivation of good time credit.
See, e.g., Madison v. Parker, 104 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 1997). Of course, the Supreme
Court has already relegated due process claims concerning length of custody to initial decisions in state court by declaring them to be habeas corpus petitions subject
to the exhaustion requirement. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641 (1997); Heck
v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). Challenges to parole denial also, presumably, would not have to satisfy the new test. See,
e.g., Maghe v. Koch, No. 96-7060, 1997 WL 76014, at *4 (10th Cir. Feb. 24, 1997)
(Conner does not expand creation of liberty interests with respect to parole); Ellis v.
District of Columbia, 84 F.3d 1413, 1418 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (Conner does not overrule
previous law concerning creation of liberty interests with respect to parole decisions,
in either an expanding or contracting direction); Orellana v. Kyle, 65 F.3d 29, 32 (5th
Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 736 (1996) (same).

Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights

Providing judicial relief only in connection with atypical and significant deprivations of freedom may not be very different from
protecting prisoners only against cruel and unusual punishment.
The Court's willingness to create such confusion in the lower
courts may indicate that a majority of the Court believes desperate measures are required to reduce the volume of federal prison
litigation in this area, particularly claims raised by individual prisoners.1 39 Conner may ultimately lead to that result, especially if
what is atypical and significant is to be judged by an objective
standard. This decision suggests that there may be no consensus
on the Court as to which procedural due process rights a prisoner
should have, but that there is an urgent desire that prisoners have
fewer due process rights than they had before Conner.
b.

Lewis v. Casey: Redefining Access to the Courts

Lewis v. Casey also poses serious questions concerning the extent to which prisoners share rights-in this case, the right of access to the courts.1 4 ° As in Conner, the Court imposed special
pleading requirements on prisoners, in a manner that suggests
prisoners may sometimes be kept from litigating in federal court
as part of their punishment. If the decision is not qualified,
Casey may reintroduce the concept of civil death as a limitation
on a prisoner's right of access to the courts.
In Casey, twenty-two inmates from various Arizona prisons
brought a class action claiming the prisons' law libraries were inadequate to ensure the Bounds v. Smith1 41 right of access to the
courts. Their complaints included inadequate training of library
staff, insufficient updating of materials, and lack of assistance for
illiterate or non-English speaking inmates. 4 2 The district judge,
finding for the plaintiffs, appointed a special master to hold hearings and draft an injunction setting forth standards and procedures for all of the Arizona prison law libraries, in order to
obviate the need for prison-by-prison, inmate-by-inmate
Several courts have also shown reluctance to apply the new limits to pretrial detainees. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 523-24 (9th Cir. 1996) (Conner
rationale inapplicable to pretrial detainees); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 530
n.4 (7th Cir. 1995) (same).
139 Procedural due process cases are, after Eighth Amendment cases, the largest
category of prisoner civil rights complaints. See Eisenberg, supra note 103.
140 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
141 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
142 Casey, 518 U.S. at 346-47.
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litigation.'4 3 Every Supreme Court Justice found this dispositive
injunction overly broad and detailed. However, over the protests
of four members of the Court, the same five Justices forming the
majority in Conner, rather than remanding the case, took the occasion to express their concerns about the overuse of federal equitable power, reliance on special masters, the need for deference
to prison administrators, federalism, and separation of powers.
Like Conner, Casey translated these general concerns into new,
prisoner-only limitations on the right in question.
Disavowing dicta in Bounds, the Court declared that the constitutional right of access to the courts does not encompass an
affirmative right to adequate prison law libraries. Moreover, it
only requires that prisoners be afforded minimally adequate support, such as libraries, provision of counsel, or perhaps simplified
court forms, to ensure they are not actually prevented from filing
non-frivolous claims pertaining to their custody or the conditions
of their custody.14 4 Therefore, before they can claim a denial of
right of access to the courts, prisoners must litigate whether or
not the claim they would have brought, had they been able to
research it (or had other appropriate assistance to enable them to
formulate a claim), would have been non-frivolous. 145 Further,
the Court held that "[t]he tools [Bounds] requires to be provided
are those that the inmates need in order to attack their sentences,
directly or collaterally, and in order to challenge the conditions
of their confinement.'

'1 46

As a result of this decision, prisoners apparently have no right
to conduct research or receive legal assistance concerning an array of civil litigation, presumably including litigation to determine such serious matters as their parental or marital status, or
to defend themselves in civil lawsuits. They also apparently have
no right to adequate legal assistance in any form during the
course of their litigation. The purpose of the right of access to
the courts is no longer the affirmative goal of enabling prisoners
143 The proceedings below had been the latest phase of prolonged litigation
before the same judge, who had found the state to be recalcitrant on previous occasions. See id. at 411-12 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
144 Id. at 351-52. An inmate might also show an eligible injury by showing that his
lawsuit had been dismissed for lack of legal knowledge. Id.
145 The majority also applied a tight version of the standing doctrine in finding the
injunction overbroad when compared to the actual injuries established by particular
dissenting in part).
plaintiffs. Compare id. at 349-54, with id. at 393-98 (Souter, J.,
146 Id. at 355.
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to litigate their disputes in the same manner as those outside
prison walls-who could visit a library of their choice, or perhaps
a legal services office-but rather the more limited instrumental
goal of prohibiting the state from preventing inmates from filing

particular types of claims.
Although the decision only addresses the right of access to libraries or legal assistance, the Court's language is broad enough
to restrict the right of access to the courts themselves. If prisoners only have a right of access to the courts to file (or avoid dis-

missal of) non-frivolous claims pertaining to their own custody or
conditions, could a state be permitted to bring back civil death

and prohibit inmates from engaging in, or even defending civil
litigation? Would Congress be permitted to impose restrictions

denying access to the federal courts to inmates who wish to bring
civil litigation outside the core areas the Court favors?14 7
The partially dissenting Justices in Casey complained that the
Court had unnecessarily imposed these new conditions, and that

the conditions themselves were unprecedented and unreasonable.' 4 8 In other contexts the Court had not required a showing of
actual injury as a prerequisite to a claimed violation of a prisoner's rights.' 49 Furthermore, the Court had never before held

that a prisoner's only right of access to the courts would be for
the limited purpose of challenging custody or prison condi-

tions, 5 ° or that the right of access to the courts did not attach
except at the filing and dismissal stages of litigation.

The dissenters were correct in describing these restrictions as
new to the Supreme Court's case law. The majority did not
147 The opinion in Casey, unlike Conner, seems more motivated by the goal of
federalism than the goal of reducing the federal caseload. In this respect, Casey is
akin to the provisions in the PLRA limiting the power of federal judges, rather than
the provisions attempting to keep individual litigants out of court. See infra text
accompanying notes 235-50. Adding a stage to litigation might seem to increase the
time a federal court must spend in determining whether a claim is viable, but on the
other hand, the new restrictive standards might, at least eventually, deter some
claims and enable others to be resolved on motion papers.
148 Casey, 518 U.S. at 391-414.
149 In Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33 (1993), for example, the Court found
that a plaintiff who complained that he had been exposed to large amounts of secondary smoke could raise a claim even though he was still healthy and might remain
so. In Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 845 (1994) (quoting Pennsylvania v. West
Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 593 (1923)), the Court held that a prisoner does not have to
"await the consummation of threatened [physical] injury to obtain preventive
relief."
150 Casey, 518 U.S. at 404 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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provide a clear answer to the question of why a prisoner's right
of access to the courts should be limited in this manner. There is
considerable discussion of how far the holding in Bounds actually went and how far it should have gone, and some general discussion about the proper role of federal courts,'151 but there is no
real explanation of why it should be considered constitutional to
bar prisoners from civil litigation. In a telling moment, Justice
Scalia remarked that it is appropriate to restrict the scope of the
right of access to the courts to litigation of claims about the
length or conditions of custody, because "[i]mpairment of any
other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration."1'52 Scalia did not explain why that should be the case, but
there may well be some subterranean originalism beneath that
statement: under common law at the time of the Constitution,
prisoners were often subject to civil death statutes and were not
considered to have the capacity to litigate.15 3 Scalia may have
assumed that it would be constitutional to go further than the
majority of Justices had authorized in this case, and to allow a
return to civil death subject only to the exception the Court
carves out.
The majority's silence also leaves the new core right of access
dangling, raising a series of questions without any rationale by
which to judge future claims. If the right to litigate, like the right
to free movement, may be suspended on conviction, then why; as
a matter of constitutional theory, is the right to litigate one's sentence or prison conditions retained? Are prisoners entitled to
bring habeas corpus and civil rights claims in federal court only
because Congress, as opposed to the Court, has created that entitlement through its statutes? If so, could Congress rescind all or
part of what it has given?1 54 Although the Court has not said so,
perhaps the core cases are exceptional because a majority of the
Court would find it to be cruel and unusual punishment to deprive a prisoner of the opportunity to litigate allegedly unconstitutional prison conditions in federal court. 155 Without access to
Id. at 349-52, 354-57.
Id. at 355.
153 See supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
154 This becomes relevant with respect to the constitutionality of some of the provisions of the PLRA. See infra text accompanying notes 251-57.
151

152

5 inmas

nharacterized

the claim in Ex porte Hull-preventing an in-

mate from submitting papers to the Court-as a due process claim, and as one rep-
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the federal courts, inmates might have little opportunity to redress serious grievances about prison conditions, and prison conditions might fall below the Eighth Amendment mark the Court
has maintained.
The new restrictions in both Conner and Casey may seem arbitrary because they are in fact the product of compromise. In a
concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas argued that Casey
did not go far enough. He argued that rather than just disavowing the Bounds dicta, the Court should have disavowed the entire holding of that case and ruled that prisoners do not have any
affirmative right to have the state assist them in their litigation
efforts. According to Thomas, Ex parte Hull and Johnson v. Avery established that prisoners have the right not to have the state
actively interfere with their litigation efforts, but that no other
precedent supported the affirmative right declared in Bounds. 5 6
Thomas had previously taken the position that the Court should
simply cancel various previously recognized prisoners' rights and
return to a hands-off posture with respect to most prisoners'
claims, including allegations of guard brutality.' 57
Thomas did not command a majority of the Court in Casey
any more than in the brutality cases. A majority of the Court
seems to believe that prisoners should have some judicially enforceable rights, including some affirmative rights, and that they
should not be barred from federal court. On the other hand, a
majority of the Court seems unwilling to live with the consequences of having declared an array of rights that many prisoners
will litigate and that will therefore require the courts to sift, especially where the prisoners are state prisoners. The result, as Conner and Casey show, is that the Court is now radically reducing
the scope of prisoners' rights in a manner that, like all compromises, leaves jagged edges. First Amendment and procedural
due process rights as well as the right of access to the courts have
resenting the proper limit of the access to the courts doctrine. See Casey, 518 U.S. at
379-381 (Thomas, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 381-82. The equal access cases on which Justice Marshall's opinion in
Bounds, see supra note 52, had, as Justice Thomas described, been contained by

subsequent case law. See Casey, 518 U.S. at 382.
157 See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 17-29 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment should never
have been applied to prison cases); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 859 (1994)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (referring sarcastically to the Court's refinements of the
"'National Code of Prison Regulation' otherwise known as the Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause").
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all been slashed; the Eighth Amendment, however, still relatively
intact, provides a back-up.
6.

Four Models of Prisoners' Rights Compared

As this brief chronicle shows, the swing of the ideological pendulum has not been complete. The Court has not come very
close to returning to a total hands-off posture, despite Justice
Thomas's advocacy. Eighth Amendment claims are certainly
cognizable, as are shreds of First Amendment, procedural due
process, and access to the courts claims. Nor is the Court very
close to the other end of the spectrum-the equality model the
Warren Court might have favored, where prisoners truly have
the same rights of expression or religion as the non-incarcerated,
unless the state can show a compelling justification for retracting
a right.
In light of the Court's incremental cuts in the cases described
above, it now seems hypocritical for the Court to continue to assert that under its accommodationist jurisprudence prisoners "retain" First Amendment, procedural due process, and court access
rights. The diluted tests, skewed procedures, and now special
pleading requirements imposed on prisoners have left most of
these rights virtually unrecognizable, even to an accommodationist. It seems more accurate to describe the current Court as recognizing a prisoner's right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment as virtually the only right that truly survives incarceration. Eighth Amendment claims themselves have been spared
some of the deep cuts other rights claims have suffered. In case
after case, the Court seems to stop retracting rights only where it
would be cruel and unusual to allow a prisoner to be deprived of
religious observances or free expression, to be subject to arbitrary treatment, or to be excluded from law libraries and even
the courts.
An Eighth Amendment model of prisoners' rights does not
necessarily provide fewer protections to prisoners. The Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause could be viewed as incorporating other Bill of Rights provisions not "inconsistent" with a prisoner's status, much as the Due Process Clause incorporates
aspects of the Bill of Rights. However, recalling the debates
about incorporation tests 158 suggests that an Eighth Amendment
158 See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), where Justices Biack,
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model, while possibly providing more truth in labeling, would not
provide any clearer standards than the Court's previous models
to determine when the federal courts should intervene to protect
prisoners against the will of state executive or legislative bodies,
or against the will of Congress. Ultimately, the question is the
same in any formulation: whether federal court deference to the
federal and state political branches should be greater in the area
of prisoners' rights in order to allow those branches freedom to
define what it means to be a prisoner, or whether deference
should be less because prisoners are at such risk in the political
arena.
As described above, the Supreme Court prohibits the political
branches from declaring prisoners entirely without free expression and religious rights, wholly subject to arbitrary punishment,
or completely civilly dead; but the Court has failed to safeguard
those rights vigorously. The reversals of the burden and standard
of proof in the First Amendment area enable prison administrators to avoid accommodating prisoners' expressive and religious
exercises for trivial reasons, out of hostility, or even for no reason at all. This practice, judging from the case law, has the greatest impact on prisoners who, like Cruz, practice a nonmainstream religion, leaving them in even greater need of the
championship of the federal courts. 5 9

The recent cases cutting into the bone of procedural due process and access to the courts rights are still too recent for their
impact to be fully assessed. The shape of procedural due process
law after Sandin v. Conner is not yet clear. The Court will still
have an opportunity, after reviewing the turmoil in the lower
courts, to return to protecting prisoners against grievous losses of
freedom. The new direction of inquiry in Conner could even
provide the Court an opportunity to abandon its positivist due
process test, which was just another means of abdicating judicial
responsibility for identifying and protecting rights by deferring to
legislative decisions.16 ° Finally, Lewis v. Casey might still be
Murphy, and Frankfurter outlined their radically different approaches to interpreting the Due Process Clause.
159 As recently as 1994, Congress believed that the federal courts are not providing enough of a safety net for prisoners' religious freedom, and that reinstituting
usual First Amendment standards to analyze prisoners' claims would not unduly restrict the prerogatives of prison administrators, as genuine security concerns could
still be honored. See infra text accompanying notes 173-79.
160 See Herman, supra note 110, at 552-55.
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distinguished as restricting only the instrumental right of access
to law libraries, and not the right of access to the courts themselves. If Casey is not so limited, the Court's stingy treatment of
the right of access to the courts in that case, combined with lessons from other prisoners' rights cases (such as the freewheeling
balancing of Turner v. Safley, and the reflexive acceptance of almost any rationale defendants offer to counter a prisoner's assertion of a right), sets the stage for the Court's acceptance of a new
form of civil death-legislation like the Prison Litigation Reform
Act, which treats prison litigation differently from all other civil
litigation, mostly in order to reduce the number of prison cases in
1 61
the federal courts.
The Supreme Court's cuts to prisoners' rights seem to have
been motivated more frequently by concern about the federal
courts' role than about the federal courts' caseload. Here, I
think the Court has been getting it right: if prisoners do have a
claim to federal court attention, the fact that there are many
cases should not be a justification for redefining the scope of the
constitutional rights at stake. Indeed, one might take the volume
of litigation as, in part, a demonstration of need.
The cases discussed in Part I illustrate that outlining prisoners'
constitutional rights is a difficult and necessarily subjective task.
The Court must continue to struggle with the question of how to
maintain an appropriate floor of protection against excessive retribution because, as Part II illustrates, Congress is, even when
not unwilling, unable to do so.
II
PRISONERS' RIGHTS AND CONGRESS

Congress has also gone through phases in its treatment of prisoners' rights, corresponding roughly to the Court's pendulum
swings. During the 1960s and 1970s, at the onset of the Court's
revolutionary phase, Congress adopted a laissez-faire position,
and did not legislate to either expand or contract prisoners' new
rights and remedies. In 1980, Congress enacted the Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Persons Act, 162 trying to put a thumb on the
scale of process by diverting some prison litigation to the states,
161
162

See infra Part II.
Pub. L. No. 96-247, 94 Stai. 349 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ia-19'7j (1994))
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and empowering the Department of Justice to participate in federal court prison litigation.
When backlash set in, Congress was at first satisfied to rattle
its sabers by enacting and introducing legislation that did not go
much beyond what the Court had already done. Then, in an interesting change of direction, Congress tried, in the doomed
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, to make it easier for state or
federal prisoners to prevail in federal court freedom of religion
claims. Most recently, the Prison Litigation Reform Act made a
serious effort to reduce the number of prisoners litigating in federal court, by slashing access and interposing new obstacles in an
astonishing variety of ways.
History shows that it has been easier for Congress to slash
rather than to build, or even to manage, the federal presence in
prisoners' rights.
A.

Taking Rights Quietly

During the 1960s, Congress at times joined the Warren Court
in promoting civil rights with landmark legislation going beyond
what the Court ever would or could have effected alone. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964163 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965164
were acts of partnership, with Congress and the Court sharing
the goal of building an effective structure of federally enforceable rights. The Court's declarations of federal rights in other areas, even during the 1960s, engendered a more hostile response.
Congress was less sympathetic, for example, to the Warren
Court's promotion of the rights of criminal defendants. Responding to the Court's expansion of substantive and procedural
rights of criminal defendants, in 1968 Congress attempted to legislatively overrule Miranda v. Arizona,165 and to cut back on fed166
eral court review of facts in state habeas corpus petitions.
Congress seemed to be more ambivalent about prisoners' rights
163 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5,
28, and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).

164 Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973-1973bb-1 (1994)).
165 Compare Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
Pub.L. No. 90-35, 82 Stat. 197 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501-02
(1994)), with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
166 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994 & Supp. 1998), overruling the Court's decision
in Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), on the level of deference to be afforded
state court findings of fact in a federal habeas corpus proceeding.
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with respect to prison conditions. The Congress of the 1960s and
70s adopted neither expansive legislation like the Civil Rights
Act or Voting Rights Act, nor hostile legislation designed to curtail the effects of the Court's rulings. Congress instead left the
issue to the courts.
B.

A ProceduralResponse: The Civil Rights of
Institutionalized Persons Act

The first major federal legislation responding to the judicial expansion of prisoners' rights exhibited some ambivalence, but
took seriously the need for federal involvement to insure humane prison conditions in state as well as federal institutions. In
the 1980 "Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act," Congress expressed concern about the "systematic deprivations of
the constitutional and Federal statutory rights" of institutionalized persons,16 7 and provided statutory authority for the United
States Attorney General to conduct litigation on behalf of the
institutionalized. 168 The legislative history of the Act is studded
with horror stories about prison conditions, as well as praise for
the successes of the Department of Justice in helping to ameliorate abysmal conditions and in improving the quality of litigation
in prison cases. Congress, in expanding the Department's operations, aimed to improve the quality of justice as well as the professional quality of federal court litigation. By involving the
executive branch in institutional litigation, Congress expressed
agreement with the Supreme Court that state and federal prison
conditions were sometimes a matter of federal concern. Congress's vision of an expanded role for the Department of Justice
was defeated, however, when President Ronald Reagan cut the
of Justice and left
budget and marching orders of his Department
69
prison litigation to fend for itself.1
In the same Act, Congress also attempted to staunch the flow
of prison cases in federal court by requiring prisoners to exhaust
167 See S. REP. No. 96-416, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 787, 788.
"Institutionalized" persons included residents of mental health institutions as well as
prisoners. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
168 S. REP. No. 96-416, at 3 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 787, 790; 42
U.S.C. § 1997a (initiation of civil actions); 42 U.S.C. § 1997c (intervention in federal
court institutional litigation).
169 See Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 7, at 13 & nn.72-74; Note, Resolving Prisoner Grievances Out of Court: 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1309, 1320 n.55
(1991) [hereinafter Resolving Prisoner Grievances Oui of Court].
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state administrative procedures 7 ' before bringing a federal court
claim, if the court believed that approach to be appropriate and
in the interests of justice, provided that the state in question had
an adequate grievance process that met fairly rigorous federal
standards.' 7 ' The hope was to deflect prisoners' claims by encouraging the states themselves to create fair dispute resolution
systems in which complaints would receive serious consideration.
Most states were unwilling to make the necessary effort to establish satisfactory grievance procedures, however, so the attempt to
promote resolution of problems without resort to federal court
litigation also fizzled. 72
In adopting this exhaustion provision, Congress seems to have
been motivated more by concern about management of the federal docket than by hostility to the claims being raised. The exhaustion procedures were intended to provide a different, frontline forum for state prisoners' grievances to be heard preliminarily. Unsatisfied grievants could still bring their cases to federal
court, perhaps even with the aid of the Department of Justice if
their claims were deemed serious. Congress was not questioning
whether prisoners had rights, including the right to litigate in federal court; Congress was encouraging the states to find alternative ways to resolve disputes so that prisoners would not require
the attention of all three branches of the federal government
quite so often.
It is notable that both parts of this well-intentioned
170 Although the Court has declined to impose an administrative exhaustion requirement for civil rights actions under § 1983, see Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457
U.S. 496 (1982), the Court had already funneled prisoners' claims potentially affecting the length of their custody to state courts, characterizing them as habeas corpus
claims requiring exhaustion of state court remedies. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475 (1973).
171 See 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e)(a)(1). Federal district courts could continue a state
prisoner's § 1983 action to compel the prisoner to exhaust a grievance only if the
state's grievance mechanism has been approved by the Department of Justice or a
district court under standards promulgated pursuant to the Act. See id.
§ 1997e(a)(2).
172 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 4 (1990); accord Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702 § 102(b), 102 Stat.
4642, 4644 (1988); see also Donald P. Lay, Exhaustion of Grievance Proceduresfor
State Prisoners Under Section 1997e of the Civil Rights Act, 71 IOWA L. REV. 935
(1986); Resolving Prisoner Grievances Out of Court, supra note 169 (finding that
even for those states that had adopted grievance mechanisms, there was not sufficient data to conclude that the number of prisoner § 1983 filings would decrease,
and urging that the statute not be hastily revised in a way that might require prisoners to exhaust unfair grievance procedures).
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congressional attempt to improve the quantity and quality of federal prison litigation failed, for want of cooperation of the executive branch and of the states.
C.
1.

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act

Congress's Goal

Congress intended the Religious Freedom Restoration Act173
(RFRA) to restore religious liberty that had been compromised
by Employment Division v. Smith,174 a case not involving prisoners. However, legislative history shows that Congress also decided to restore the religious freedom of inmates suffering the
effects of the grudging constitutional test of O'Lone v. Estate of
Shabazz.175 Senator Reid proposed an amendment to exclude
prisoners from RFRA's provisions, but Senators Kennedy and
Hatch made impassioned speeches championing the need for
greater religious freedom in prison, and after debate, the amend176
ment was defeated.
Congress' strategy in RFRA was to restore the compelling interest test, established in prior federal court rulings, to federal
judicial evaluation of claimed infringements of the freedom of
religion.1 77 Senator Hatch described this test as striking an appropriate balance even for prison litigation. He argued that if
the state truly had an interest in limiting religious freedom to
preserve order and security within a prison, that interest would
173 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4.
174 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (First Amendment guarantee of freedom of religion "does
not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct
that his religion prescribes (or proscribes)"'). Id. at 879 (quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)).
175 See supra text accompanying notes 88-93.
176 139 CONG. REc. 14,350-68 (1993). Thirteen state attorneys general, and U.S.
Attorney General Janet Reno opposed the amendment to exclude prisons, see id. at
14,351-52, while all fifty state-prison directors supported it, see id. at 14,355-56. The
O'Lone test was one of the principal subjects of the debate. Compare id. at 14,351,
with id. at 14,356 (statement of Sen. Reid).
In large measure, the debate was a war of anecdotes, with Senators Reid and
Simpson proffering examples of "bizarre" claims by scary inmates abusing the privilege of federal litigation, see id. at 14,354, while Senator Hatch emphasized the importance of promoting religion in prison, and expressed his belief that a Catholic
prisoner should be at least as entitled to seek the aid of the federal courts if he had
been denied communion as the "prisoner who sued prison administrators in Nevada
for serving him creamy peanut butter rather than the chunky peanut butter he requested." id. at 14,363.
177 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(5) & (b)(1).
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be considered compelling and the state could still prevail.1 78
Conversely, if the state did not have any genuine need to restrict
religious exercise, inmates should be permitted to follow all of
the dictates of their religions, not just those a federal court might
deem "adequate."
Congress was right in believing that the test applied would
make a difference to federal judges evaluating the religion claims
of the unpopular, including prisoners. Once lower federal courts
began applying the compelling interest test required by RFRA,
prisoners' claims about prison administrators' refusal to allow
them to wear or use religious paraphernalia, to grow facial hair
or beards, or to comply with dietary restrictions, began to prevail
far more frequently than at any time since O'Lone.' 9 The Act's
burden and standard of proof, as well as its positive attitude
about the significance of a prisoner's ability to observe religious
rituals, had an impact. Federal judges who had found, under
O'Lone, that prisoners had not been able to prove that prison
administrators were exaggerating their concern that a yarmulke,
for example, might hide a weapon, could easily conclude that
those same prison administrators could not show they had any
compelling need to prohibit inmates from wearing yarmulkes.
2.

The Court's Response

This congressional attempt to help prisoners in their litigation
efforts also failed when RFRA was invalidated by the Supreme
Court. In City of Boerne v. Flores,180 the Court found that Congress had exceeded its constitutional power in enacting RFRA,
because Congress may not "enforce a constitutional right by
139 CONG. Rnc. at 14,362.
See, e.g., Sasnett v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1018 (7th Cir. 1996) (prison officials' assertion that they may prohibit prisoners from wearing crucifixes because their
points, even on small crosses, might be capable of lacerating the skin, is rejected
under the RFRA test); Harris v. Lord, 957 F. Supp. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Moslem
inmate may not be prohibited from attending group religious service, without showing of some compelling reason).
On the other hand, because RFRA also spoke of the need for deference to the
judgment of prison officials, many claims were also denied when the prison's justifications were found to be compelling. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 874 (1996) (prison demonstrated sufficiently compelling reason in light of policy of deference to justify denying Native American
inmate the opportunity to use a sweat lodge or to grow his hair); Lawson v. Singletary, 85 F.3d 502 (11th Cir. 1996) (viewed deferentially, prison has compelling interest in censoring Hebrew Israelite literature found to be racist and inflammatory).
180 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
178
179
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changing what the right is."' 8 1 Congress' power under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court explained, is only
remedial and not substantive. 82 The Court therefore distinguished Katzenbach v. Morgan,83 and held that Congress could
not add in this manner to the floor of constitutional protection
provided by the Court.
Flores stymied Congress in its attempt to redraw the balance
between prisoners' religious freedom and prison administrators'
concerns by encouraging the courts to hear claims more sympathetically, rather than by trying to act directly. In light of this
separation of powers ruling and the Court's burgeoning interpretation of the Tenth Amendment, 1" 4 it is not clear what, if anything, Congress can do to enhance the freedom of prisoners,
especially state prisoners, to exercise their religions. Might Congress use its power under the Commerce Clause, for example, to
require state prisons to allow Catholic inmates to possess rosaries, or to provide kosher diets? In the recent case of Pennsylvania Department of Corrections v. Yeskey,185 the Supreme
Court found that the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to
state prison inmates, because the statute included general terminology and did not exclude prisons. At the same time, the Court
dourly warned that the question of whether Congress actually
had power under the Commerce Clause, or anywhere else, to impose this requirement on state prisons remained open.' 86
While it is relatively easy for Congress to curtail the Court's
expansion of rights by enacting restrictive remedial and other
measures clearly within its power,'8 7 it may be practically and
politically impossible for Congress to move in the other direction. Even if Congress could muster the political will to specifically and explicitly champion particular religious freedoms for
prisoners, Flores seems to require Congress to add to a right only
at 519.
182 Id. at 529 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)).
183 384 U.S. 641 (1966) (Voting Rights Act provision prohibiting states from
adopting English language proficiency requirements for voters is a permissible exercise of Congress' powers under Section V of the Fourteenth Amendment).
184 U.S. CONST. amend. X. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Congress may not "commandeer" state administrative officials to enforce federal
policy).
185 524 U.S. 206 (1998).
186 Id. at 220-21.
187 See infra text accompanying notes 216-18. 247-54 for an account of federal
court case law upholding the restrictive provisions of the PLRA.
181 Id.
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by adding remedies, and not by enhancing the substantive right
itself. If Congress may not specify that an individual has a right
to a religiously acceptable diet in prison on any terms other than
those the Court has already set forth in O'Lone, making additional remedies available to prisoners who are not receiving such
a diet will be ineffectual. Adequate remedies already exist if a
prisoner can prevail in a religion claim under the O'Lone standard. The obstacle to relief lies not in the scope of remedies
available, but in the scope of the diluted right the Court has
deemed appropriate.1 8 8
The text of RFRA itself is instructive on the political realities
surrounding federal legislation expanding prisoners' rights.
Whether this legislation still would have passed if its applicability
to prisoners had been set forth in the statute itself instead of buried in the legislative history is debatable. Likewise, it is questionable whether the Americans with Disabilities Act would have
been applied to state prisoners if that subject had been openly
debated and written into the statute. The same political realities
that have led Congress to pass the PLRA and not to pass any
legislation explicitly favorable to prisoners since the Civil Rights
of Institutionalized Persons Act, which only offered procedural
assistance, make it seem unlikely that the scope of Flores will be
tested with respect to prisoners. It remains to be seen whether
any form of creative legislation can or will restore any part of the
protection of religious freedom Congress tried to provide in
RFRA.
D. From Menacing to Slashing-The Prison Litigation
Reform Act
Congress' recent attempts to restrict prisoner access to the federal courts, on the other hand, have been almost universally accepted by the lower federal courts because they are procedurally
based.
In earlier terms, an increasingly conservative Congress had
been content to grandstand by enacting provisions that sounded
188 One power Congress retains is the power to spend federal money to bribe the
states to provide additional support for prisoners' religious exercise. Senator Dole
had proposed the Criminal Justice Construction Reform Act, S. 186, 97th Cong.
(1981), to provide federal funding and expert assistance to states so that they could
avoid the supervision of the federal courts by actually improving their prison conditions. That bill never passed; a bill to replace RFRA by spending money would
seem similarly doomed.
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as if they restricted prison litigation, but did not actually change
the law in any significant way."' 9 Members of Congress could
gain whatever political advantage "tough on crime" positions
conferred without actually doing much. But eventually, euphemistically named acts like the "Stop Turning Out Prisoners Act
191
(STOP)" 190 gave way to the "Prison Litigation Reform Act,
which settled down to reform prison litigation in two ways. First,
the PLRA contains the STOP provisions, which were designed to
clip the wings of federal judges by reducing their remedial power
in institutional litigation. 92 Second, in moves that have commanded less attention from the public or from scholars, 193 the
PLRA deters and prevents individual prison litigation by imposing financial and other restrictions on prisoner-plaintiffs. This
second tactic is accomplished by imposing additional requirements on some types of claims, by punishing prisoner-plaintiffs
whether they win or lose, and by refusing forma pauperis status
to plaintiffs who have previously filed three unsuccessful petitions. In introducing the legislation, Senator Dole explained that
such restrictions were necessary because federal court complaints
filed by prisoners had grown astronomically, and involved such
grievances as insufficient storage space "and yes, being served
chunky peanut butter instead of the creamy variety."' 194
189
The Violent Crime Control and Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322,
108 Stat. 1827 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994 & Supp. 1998)), known as the
Helms Amendment, for example, provided that federal courts "shall not hold prison
or jail crowding unconstitutional under the [E]ighth [A]mendment except to the extent that an individual plaintiff ...proves that the crowding causes the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment." This is a fair statement of the Supreme Court law
that existed both before and after the Helms Amendment. See Elizabeth R. Alex-

ander, Confronting the Helms Amendment, in PRISONERS AND THE LAW 7-73 (Ira P.

Robbins ed., 1998). As Alexander pointed out, serious separation of powers questions would arise if Congress had indeed attempted to change the quantum of proof
required to demonstrate a constitutional violation. Id. at 7-76-7-78.
190 STOP was introduced by Senator Hutchinson, 141 CONG. REC. S2649 (daily
ed. Feb. 14, 1995), as a response to a Philadelphia case in which a federal court
consent decree had set a cap on the number of inmates who could be held in city jail
in order to reduce overcrowding. See Overhauling the Nation's Prisons: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) (testimony of Lynne
Abraham, District Attorney of Philadelphia).
191 Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996).
192 These were the provisions largely anticipated by the Supreme Court's earlier
decisions. See Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 7, at 47-62.
193 Tushnet and Yackle are virtually the only non-student law review authors to
have discussed these provisions, although at far less length than the institutional

reform provisions. See id. at 64-70.
194 See 141 CONG. REC. S14,413 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995). See infra Part III.A for
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The legislative process leading to the passage of the PLRA was
characterized by haste and lack of any real debate. The Act was
passed as a rider to the Balanced Budget Downpayment Act,

without a Judiciary Committee Report and without committee
mark-up. 1 95 Its provisions, which amend a number of different
sections of the United States Code, 9 6 bear many signs of the
haste with which they were passed. Key terms were not defined,197 some provisions conflicted with preexisting law, 198 and
even the title could have used editing: entitled the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, it was actually passed in 1996.
In substance, the Act takes a scattershot approach to reducing
the cost and volume of prison litigation in the federal courts.

These strategies do not necessarily reduce frivolous litigation,
however, and do not necessarily save the federal courts money.
1.

PLRA's Money Saving Regime

Some provisions of the PLRA seem to cut expenses incurred
by the federal courts in litigation. For example, the Act attempts
to save costs of transporting prisoners to court hearings by providing for proceedings to be conducted by telephone, video
a discussion of the particular case that gave rise to the characterization of prisoners'
litigation as focusing on peanut butter.
195 See 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
196 Specifically, the PLRA amended the Proceedings in forma pauperis statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1915 (1994 & Supp. 1998), originally enacted to excuse indigent litigants
from paying filing fees, the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e (1994 & Supp. 1998), and added 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994 & Supp. 1998), a
new section on remedies.
197 Some new provisions of the in forma pauperis statute relating to payment of
fees, for example, apply to "civil actions" or appeals of judgments in "civil actions,"
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2), without defining what civil actions are covered. The federal
courts have already spent substantial amounts of time considering whether the term
"civil action" includes habeas corpus proceedings, see, e.g., Reyes v. Keane, 90 F.3d
676 (2d Cir. 1996) (habeas petitions are not civil actions); Van Doren v.
Mazurkiewicz, 935 F. Supp. 604 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (filing fee provisions apply to
habeas corpus petitions), and mandamus proceedings, see, e.g., Martin v. United
States, 96 F.3d 853 (7th Cir. 1996) (provisions should apply if mandamus arises out
of civil proceedings).
198 One amendment to the in forma pauperis statute conflicted with a preexisting
federal rule of appellate procedure; no one had seemed to be aware of the conflict
until a court, after enactment, had to puzzle out the relationship between the two
provisions. See Jackson v. Stinnett, 102 F.3d 132 (5th Cir. 1996) (provisions of
PLRA requiring financial disclosure prior to appeal supersede Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 24(a) providing that a prisoner may appeal in forma pauperis a
case brought in forma pauperis below unless the district court decertifies the prisoner's status).
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conference, or other telecommunications technology, or at the
inmate's facility. 199 These expenditures, of course, would only

arise in connection with those allegations district judges have
deemed substantial enough to warrant holding hearings, even

under the current heightened standards of what constitutes a viable federal claim. These provisions do not specifically address
problems caused by frivolous litigation, and they may not be

well-designed to save much money. They are, however, provisions that might, if not implemented cautiously by the district
judges, detract from the fairness of federal proceedings adjudicating those claims still considered viable by the Supreme Court.

Other provisions aim to save the states money by limiting
prison litigation defendants' exposure with respect to attorney's
fees awards, 2" and to save the federal government money even

more effectively by providing that the United States is simply not
20 1
liable for costs incurred by a prevailing prisoner-plaintiff.
These provisions are aimed, by their very terms, only at success-

ful litigation, and not at the peanut butter cases, which do not
generally prevail. One provision that does target frivolous cases
tries to save the states time and therefore money by safeguarding
defendants against an adverse default judgment if they waive the
right to reply to a prisoner complaint.2 °2 Although saving money
might seem a logical goal for a rider to a budget act, the Administrative Office estimated that implementing the PLRA would, at

least in the short run, entail a significant cost to the federal
courts, none of which had been budgeted.20 3
199 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(f). This provision might also be regarded as attempting to
remove an incentive for prisoners to litigate by reducing the chance that bringing a
viable lawsuit will result in a welcome trip to court to break the tedium of prison life.
200 Id. § 1997e(d)(1) (limiting the predicate for awards of fees); id. § 1997e(d)(3)
(limiting the hourly rate of fees to be awarded); id. § 1997e(d)(2) (requiring up to
25% of plaintiff's monetary judgment to be applied to pay defendant's attorney's
fees, and requiring defendant to pay attorney's fees only if they are not greater than
150% of the judgment). The provision then cautiously specifies that these protections are only for the state defendants and that the plaintiff inmate may be required
to pay greater attorney's fees.
201 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f)(1). Here too, the drafters make clear that the Act is asymmetrical and that costs may be assessed against the prisoner plaintiff. Id.
§ 1997e(g)(2).
202 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g)(1). The defendant may wait to see whether the court
deems the allegation serious enough to order a reply. Id. § 1997e(g)(2).
203 In a June 21, 1995 assessment, the Administrative Office estimated the "potential annua! resource costs of [the PLRA1 could he more than $239 million and 2,096
positions, of which at least 280 would be judicial officers - Article III judges and/or
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2.

The PLRA's Financial Squeeze on Prisoners

a. Risk of Dismissal as the Price of Indigency
The vast majority of prisoners who litigate in federal court
have been able to establish that they are indigent and therefore
have typically received the courts' authorization to file their lawsuits in forma pauperis-without payment of fees or security.2 "4
This dispensation always came with a thorn: in reviewing the
prisoner's affidavit of indigency, district judges were also invited
to review the merits of the claim and to dismiss the complaint sua
sponte if it appeared frivolous or malicious.2 °5 This authority is
expanded in the PLRA to also allow the district judge to dismiss
a prisoner's complaint for failure to state a claim,20 6 and to dismiss the complaint sua sponte if the defendant seems entitled to
raise an immunity defense. 0 7 Note that the courts are invited to
treat prisoner complaints more summarily than any other type of
litigation: dismissal may be sua sponte, replies might not be required, default judgments are precluded, and sua sponte dismissal may be predicated on the failure to state a claim or on an
affirmative defense (immunity), which in any other litigation
would be considered waived if not raised.20 8
b.

Prepayment of Costs

Prisoners who can afford the usual filing fees can avoid the risk
of dismissal, unless they cannot afford an attorney and seek asmagistrate judges." 142 CONG. REC. 52285-02, 2296 (1996) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). The bill provided no funds to cover these projected expenses. Id.
204 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A
Study of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610,
617 (1979)(ninety-five percent of prisoner complaints filed in forma pauperis).
205 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
206 The Supreme Court had held that the frivolousness standard for dismissal
under § 1915 was very different from dismissal for failure to state a claim. See
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329-30 (1989). At least one court of appeals judge
has expressed concern about the constitutionality of this provision of the PLRA, in
light of Neitzke. See Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490-93 (11th Cir. 1997)
(Lay, J., concurring) ("While courts have recognized that this seemingly innocuous
change is a significant expansion of the court's power ...nothing ...indicates that
Congress was aware of the real meaning of the change. See 141 CONG. REC.
S14,413-S14,419 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995); 141 CONG. REc. S7525-S7527 (daily ed.
May 25, 1995).").
207 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). The district court may also prevent an appeal
from being taken in forma pauperis by certifying that the appeal is not taken in good
faith.
Id. § 1915(a)(3).
2 08
See FED. R. Civ. P. 12.
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signment of counsel. 20 9 Those who cannot afford to litigate and
who therefore apply for permission to proceed in forma pauperis
will now nevertheless be liable to pay filing fees, on an installment plan. First comes a bureaucratic ordeal for the inmate and
his or her present and former jailers. The inmate must submit,
with a forma pauperis affidavit, a "certified copy of the trust fund
account statement (or institutional equivalent) for the prisoner
for the 6-month period immediately preceding the fling of the
complaint or notice of appeal, obtained from the appropriate of210
ficial of each prison at which the prisoner is or was confined.
Next comes an accounting procedure for the court. An inmate
who has any funds is required to prepay twenty percent of the
greater of the average monthly deposits to the inmate's account,
or the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the
six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint or appeal. 21 ' The prisoner is then required to make monthly payments
of twenty percent of each previous month's income until the fee
is paid.2 12
These provisions have two obvious motivations-to act as bureaucratic and financial disincentives. First, the bureaucratic hurdles may be high enough to cause some litigious prisoners to
stumble and never get the planned case to court at all. Second,
the requirement of payment is designed to deter litigation by
making it costly.21 3 If prisoners can proceed in forma pauperis,
they do not have the financial disincentive that might cause other
litigants to forego litigation possibilities. For years, critics like
Chief Justice Rehnquist have complained that indigent prisoners
have something to gain and nothing to lose by litigating whatever
comes into their heads. 214 This provision is more a deterrent
than an economic measure. It seems unlikely that these fee-col209 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).
210 Id. § 1915(a)(2). Note that much of the burden of supplying these documents
falls not on the inmate but on state prison officials, who are required to prepare
these documents for the federal courts' benefit. In light of the recent decision in
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997), might state officials argue that this requirement violates the Tenth Amendment?
211 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
212 Id. § 1915(b)(2). Again, it is the "agency having custody of the prisoner" that
is required to "forward payments from the prisoners' account to the clerk of the
court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid."
Id. Note another added burden to state officials who might take their Tenth
Amendment rights seriously.
213 See 141 CONG. REC. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
214 See supra note 72.
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lecting procedures will actually offset the costs of federal court

litigation. In fact, the costs of administering this payment scheme
might well exceed the income derived from piecemeal payments
of dollars and pennies.2 1 5
Requiring only prisoners and no one else to repay costs when

they proceed in forma pauperis has been challenged as a denial
of equal protection. Thus far, the courts have unanimously found
nothing constitutionally suspect in these provisions.2 16 A Warren
Court case, Rinaldi v. Yeager, 2 17 had declared a provision recouping costs for criminal appeals transcripts only from incarcerated appellants to be a denial of equal protection. The Eleventh
Circuit distinguished Rinaldi "easily" on the ground that the
Supreme Court in that case had found no good reason to single
out prisoners, whereas the PLRA is based on what the court
found to be a rational distinction between prisoners and all
others-prisoners need to be prevented from filing baseless lawsuits.21 8 Could this assumption be borne out if substantiation

were required? So far, the courts have not required proof of this
nexus, but have simply assumed its rationality on the basis of the
conventional wisdom about prison litigation.
Even if the new financial disincentives do reduce the number
of prisoner cases, there is no way to assess whether the prisoners
215 See Julie M. Rieue, Note, The Least Among Us: Unconstitutional Changes in
Prisoner Litigation Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 47 DUKE L.J.
117, 138 nn.112-13 (1997) (footnote 112 discusses the difficulty of collecting filing
fees from prisoners, including legislative testimony of one court clerk that it would
take over six years for a court to collect a $25 filing fee from a prisoner earning $3
per month and footnote 113 discusses the author's empirical study in the Middle
District of North Carolina demonstrating that prisoner account balances of over $10
are exceptional) [hereinafter The Least Among Us].
216 See, e.g., Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281 (6th Cir. 1997) (fee requirements
do not violate right of access to the courts, First Amendment, due process, equal
protection, or double jeopardy rights); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483 (11th Cir.
1997); cf. Evans v. Croom, 650 F.2d 521 (4th Cir. 1981) (prisoners are assured necessities of life by state, and so do not have same financial needs as others), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1153 (1982).
217 384 U.S. 305, 308-10 (1966).
218 Mitchell, 112 F.3d at 1489. Another petitioner's claim that this provision denies equal protection was rejected on the theory that the provision is rationally related to the legitimate goal of sparing the courts the burden of frivolous prison
litigation. Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1286. The court applied rational basis scrutiny on
the theory that prisoners are not a suspect classification, and that no fundamental
right was involved because poor prisoners are not actually denied their right of access to the courts-the Act provides that inmates who do not have the 20% prepayment may not be prohibited from litigating in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(4). Hampton, 106 F.3d at 1286-87.
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who are deterred would have brought frivolous or substantial
claims.2 19 Senator Kyl, in introducing the PLRA to the Senate,
announced that the amount of the filing fee required under the
PLRA was "small enough not to deter a prisoner with a meritorious claim, yet large enough to deter frivolous claims and multiple
filings., 221 This assertion does not seem to have been based on
anything other than wishful thinking. If it is not possible to calculate a filing fee that will separate the wheat from the chaff,
which is worse-to risk deterring or precluding some meritorious
suits, or to tolerate some that are not meritorious? These new
provisions may address quantity, but do not address the quality
of litigation.
c. Assignment of Damages and Payment of Costs
In addition, under section 807 of the PLRA, prevailing plaintiffs will find their compensatory damage awards directly assigned to satisfy any outstanding restitution order against them,
evidently without any opportunity for the prisoner to contest this
diversion of funds. Under section 804(c), prisoners, unlike any
other litigants, must pay awards of costs against them in full,221
which eliminates the discretion a court might otherwise exercise
to mitigate awards of costs, or excuse costs in cases brought in
good faith. 222 Thus, prisoners lose financially, regardless of
whether they win or lose their lawsuits. If they win, they may be
unable to collect costs; if they lose, they cannot be excused from
paying costs in full. In either case, they are treated differently
from all other litigants.
d.

The Three Strikes Provision

Under section 1915(g), a prisoner may not "bring a civil action
or appeal a judgment" in forma pauperis if the prisoner has:
on [three] or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of
the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief
219 The inmates themselves might in fact be unable to distinguish the frivolous
from the non-frivolous because they are not lawyers and usually do not have access
to a lawyer. See Eisenberg, supra note 103.
220 See 141 CONG. REc. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995).
221 This section amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915(f) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
222 Weaver v. Toombs. 948 F.2d 1004, 1013-14 (6th Cir. 1991) (costs award reduced); Marks v. Calendine, 80 F.R.D. 24, 31 (N.D.W. Va. 1978) (goud faith).
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may be granted, unless theprisoner is under imminent danger
of serious physical injury.

It is obvious what motivates this restriction. For years, federal
courts have been perplexed by the question of how to handle
litigants who persist in filing frivolous claims. Some judges have
tried enjoining recidivist litigants from filing any complaints at
all, but have been chastised because the right of access to the
courts entitles plaintiffs to fie papers that do state a claim.2 24 If a
judge specifically enjoins a persistent litigant from filing any
more frivolous complaints, the court must then spend the same
amount of time determining whether or not a new complaint is
indeed frivolous.
Congress's new provision does not bar litigation; it just requires the previously unlucky plaintiff to prepay fees in full
before filing a fourth complaint.2 2 5 The problem with this provision is equally obvious, especially to anyone who recalls the story
of The Boy Who Cried Wolf. There may come a time when there
really is a wolf. Just because a prisoner has brought three complaints that did not meet the courts' current exacting standards
for stating a constitutional claim, does not mean the prisoner will
not develop a legitimate or compelling claim. In fact, it is sometimes the persistent litigants (particularly jailhouse lawyers) who
tend to generate serious claims. Rodney Haymes, for example, a
jailhouse lawyer who tried litigating claims on behalf of other
prisoners during the 1970s (certainly more than three unsuccessfully), was such an irritant to his jailers that they transferred him
to a far more rigorous prison in retaliation for his circulation of a
petition for redress of grievances-an exercise of a right a court
subsequently found guaranteed under Johnson v. Avery and the
First Amendment.2 2 6 As noted above, it is not apparent that indigent, poorly educated pro se litigants can always tell which
claims are frivolous and refrain from bringing only those claims.
It is also not apparent that inmates who presumably could have
223
224

28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
Restrictions on access to the courts must be tailored to avoid precluding meri-

torious claims. De Long v. Hennessey, 912 F.2d 1144, 1148 (9th Cir. 1990); Abdullah
v. Gatto, 773 F.2d 487, 488 (2d Cir. 1985). Even abusive litigants cannot be completely barred from filing lawsuits. Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329, 331-32
(3d Cir. 1990); In re Davis, 878 F.2d 211, 212-13 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Powell, 851
F.2d 427, 434 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
225 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
226 See Montanye v. Haymes, 547 F.2d 188, 191 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 967 (1977).
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met the new statute's exacting standards of indigency would be
able to find funding if they did have a serious claim. This provision may reduce the volume of litigation, but again does so without sorting the wheat from the chaff.
The PLRA drafters seem to favor the risk that substantial
claims will be kept out of court over the risk that non-substantial
claims will be let in. This seems true even though the risk to the
court is one of time, while the risk to the inmate is that some of
the few serious constitutional violations the courts still recognize
may go unredressed. Notably, the only circumstance where the
drafters recalculate and prove unwilling to impose the risk on the
would-be prisoner-plaintiff is when the inmate can show a risk of
"serious physical injury."2'2 7 The Act does not define serious
physical injury, however, and thus it is left to the courts to decide
just how great that risk must be. Would the exception include
the threatened injury of inadequate medical care, or the anticipated injury of attacks by other inmates or guards? It clearly
would not include a prisoner who, like the plaintiff in Cruz v.
Beto, was being prevented from practicing his religion or even
being punished for practicing his religion, or a prisoner who has
suffered an unfairly imposed atypical and significant deprivation
of freedom.2 2 8 Like the current Supreme Court, Congress seems
inclined to privilege prisoners' claims of cruel and unusual punishment, especially those with a physical element, over claims of
a right to share other rights with the non-incarcerated.

227

See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).

One district court, in a rare instance of taking a challenge to the provisions of
the PLRA seriously, found this provision unconstitutional, holding that the restriction imposes a "substantial burden" on the affected inmate's fundamental right of
access to the courts, therefore applying strict scrutiny and concluding that this provision is not narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest, see
Lyon v. Vande Krol, 940 F. Supp. 1433, 1438 (S.D. Iowa 1996), but the Court of
Appeals then held that the prisoner plaintiff, who could have paid the filing fee,
lacked standing to challenge the provision's constitutionality, id., 127 F.3d 763 (8th
Cir. 1997). Other courts upheld the provision. See Rodriguez v. Cook, 163 F.3d 584,
587-91 (10th Cir. 1998) (upholding provision); In re Tyler, 110 F.3d 528, 529 (8th Cir.
1997); Abdul-Wadood v. Nathan, 91 F.3d 1023, 1025 (7th Cir. 1996) (both enforcing
1915(g) without questioning its constitutionality); see also The Least Among Us,
supra note 215, at 125-51 (strict scrutiny of these claims should be required; threestrikes provision, among others, is unconstitutional); Simone Schonenberger, Note,
A___s Denied The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 86 Ky. L.J. 457 (1997-1998)
(three-strikes provision, unlike the other filing fee provisions, is unconstitutional).
228
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Non-FinancialDisincentive

e.

Under section 809, a federal prisoner-plaintiff will lose good
time credit if a court finds the claim was filed for a malicious
purpose or to harass the defendant, or if the prisoner testifies
falsely or otherwise knowingly presents false evidence or information to the court.2 2 9 The scope of punishment and lack of process of this provision far exceed sanctions that could be imposed
on any non-prisoner litigant under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, or for perjury or contempt, absent a separate
proceeding. Prisoners and only prisoners can be punished by a
new term of incarceration if their testimony is not found credible.
If, for example, a prisoner testifies that he has been brutalized by
a guard and a judge or jury credits the guard's defensive testimony, the prisoner might find his sentence extended, without the
procedural niceties that a contempt or perjury trial would have
afforded other civil litigants.
3.

The New Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act

The PLRA amendment to the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act (CRIPA) contains another undefined reference to
"physical injury."23 Under § 1997e(e), prisoners may not bring
federal civil actions for "mental or emotional injury" suffered
while in custody without a "prior showing of physical injury. "231
Under previous law (still current law for all non-prisoners)
mental or emotional distress may be compensable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.232 In one case demonstrating the effect of this
new section, a state prisoner exposed to asbestos while working
in a prison kitchen brought a § 1983 action subsequent to enactment of this provision, only to be told that exposure to asbestos
was not the type of "physical injury" this provision requires, and
that this prisoners-only limitation to § 1983 is not
unconstitutional.2 3 3
This section amended 28 U.S.C. § 1932.
42 U.S.C. § 1997e (1994 & Supp. 1998) (suits by prisoners).
A separate section of the PLRA, section 805, also amends the Federal Tort
Claims Act to impose the same limitation, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
232 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
233 Zehner v. Trigg, 952 F. Supp. 1318 (S.D. Ind.), affd, 133 F.3d 459 (7th Cir.
1997). The court held that Congress in this provision only restricted the prisoner's
remedies, and not the prisoner's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment, rejecting separation of powers, access to the courts, and equal
protection claims. Id. at 1328 (citing 141 CONG. REC. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995
(statement of Sen. Kyl)). Catching Congress in another example of sloppy drafting,
229
230
231
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The new version of CRIPA also drops the limited exhaustion
requirement that the earlier law had predicated on a state's creation of an approved grievance mechanism.2 34 As a result, litiga-

tion is not deferred, but simply disallowed.
4.

18 U.S.C. § 3626 ("Appropriate Remedies with Respect to
Prison Conditions")

a.

Limitations on Prospective Relief

This Section of the Act does not target frivolous cases, but
cases where a prisoner-plaintiff has prevailed despite the rigors
of current federal law. Here, Congress turns to restricting reme-

dies for the prevailing plaintiffs.
Another myth about prison litigation is that federal judges are
liberal busybodies who delight in interfering with the states' ad-

ministration of their prisons through unnecessarily intrusive
micromanagement. 23 5 This section of the PLRA imposes a series

of commands on district judges who issue prospective relief in
prison cases. (Note again that this means that, despite the rigors
the court wondered what Congress might have meant by requiring the prisoner to
make a "prior" showing: does this mean "prior in time" asked the court, so that it
must somehow be made before filing a civil action and, if so, in what manner or what
forum would such a showing be made? Id. at 1323 n.3. The court did not answer the
question it posed, in light of its ruling on the substance of the plaintiffs claim.
The Fifth Circuit helpfully construed the "physical injury" requirement to incorporate Eighth Amendment standards-the injury must be more than de minimis but
need not be "significant," see Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)), and thus was able to uphold its constitutionality. Construing the physical injury requirement as consistent with the Eighth
Amendment still excludes cases where constitutional violations are not physical.
Does this mean that prison guards now have license to terrorize prisoners as long as
they do not physically wound them? See Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 605 (6th
Cir. 1986) (officer brandished a knife and threatened paraplegic prisoners without
justification).
Do suits for "mental or emotional distress" include all litigation about violations
of the First Amendment freedom of expression or religion, where injuries are not
usually physical, or litigation about inhumane prison conditions-not only asbestos,
but filth or rodents-that leave no physical mark?
234 See supra text accompanying notes 170-72.
235 See 141 CONG. REC. S14,413-S14,414 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1995) (statement of
Sen. Dole); id. at S14,418 (statement of Sen. Hatch). Another goal of the PLRA
was to get the federal courts off the backs of the states so that the states could use
the money in their prison budgets for more beds instead of more humane conditions.
See Overhauling the Nation's Prisons: Testimony Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 1995 WL 496,909 (1995) [hereinafter Testimony] (testimony of Lane McCot..... Exectiv- -ircrtnr h Den't of Corrections); id. at 1995 WL 475,404
(testimony of William P. Barr).
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of current federal law, the prisoner-plaintiff has prevailed, suggesting that the case is probably not frivolous by any reasonable
definition.)
These new limiting provisions are more a boon for prison defendants' lawyers than for the defendants themselves. It is common knowledge that prison conditions cases sometimes border
on collusion. The prison warden-defendants would certainly prefer to run institutions that are not overcrowded, that have adequate ventilation, adequate nutrition, and enough security to
prevent inmates from attacking one another, and to prevent
overworked guards from using shows of force to control inmates,
but they often lack adequate funding to do so, and so are delighted if a court requires the legislature to increase their budgets. There are some prison cases in which prison administrators
vigorously defend their actions (censorship, confiscation of valuables) as required by the need for security. These cases tend to
concern the rights of individuals and focus on particular incidents, after disciplinary proceedings. In the type of systemic
challenge Congress addressed in 18 U.S.C. § 3626, however, the
defendants generally would be pleased to address prisoners' requests, if only they had the funding. In light of the myth of peanut butter, state legislatures are unlikely to allocate more money
to make prisons more comfortable, when the public would prefer
to subsidize additional prison beds rather than additional comforts. The federal courts therefore became a necessary lever.
If prison conditions sink below the level required under current federal law, federal courts can issue orders requiring the defendants to improve conditions, which gives the wardens clout in
asking the state for more money. Congress, in its current federalist mode, however, is not comfortable with that role. In the
PLRA, Congress accepts that the similarly inclined Supreme
Court nevertheless believes that the federal courts will (and
should) find some prison conditions to fall below minimum federal constitutional standards.
The PLRA requires that in ensuring that prospective relief, including preliminary relief, is narrowly tailored to redress only the
precise violation proved by that plaintiff, the district judge consider whether lesser alternative means would correct the violation, and give weight to any adverse impact the relief might cause
to public safety or the operation of the criminal justice system.236
236

18 U.S.C. §§ 3626(a)(1) & (2) (1994 & Supp. 1998).
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This section contains a fair amount of grandstanding. As
Professors Tushnet and Yackle note, the Section does not radically change the law governing injunctions, 3 7 especially in light
of the fact that the Supreme Court was moving in the same direction in Lewis v. Casey.238 The chief purpose of this section seems
to be precatory, in that Congress attempts to dissuade district
judges from granting injunctive relief, or if they are granting relief, encourages them to keep it narrow. The provision, of
course, trades judicial modesty for the increased caseload required to litigate each prisoner's dispute individually (if the2 39prisoners are not discouraged from bringing individual cases).
By incorporating the stillborn "Stop Turning Out Prisoners
Act," Congress prohibits courts from issuing any order that entails releasing prisoners unless three requirements are met: overcrowding is the primary cause of a violation of federal rights; the
court has previously entered an order for less intrusive relief that
has failed to remedy the violation; and the defendant has had a
reasonable amount of time to comply with the previous court order.2 40 This section does not seem to represent any significant
change in the law, at least according to some courts. Release orders are singled out not because the federal courts were indeed
routinely turning out state prisoners, but for political advantage:
Congress protects the public against dangerous felons the courts
might be releasing, regardless of whether that was likely to happen, and regardless of whether it will happen any less often
237 Tushnet & Yackle, supra note 7, at 47-59. It is, of course, well established that
relief for constitutional violations should not extend further than necessary to cure
the constitutional violation. See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489-90 (1992).
238 See supra text accompanying notes 140-55.
239 If this section does have the desired effect of serving the goals of federalism by
reducing the number and scope of federal court prison injunctions, it may well be at
odds with the goal of reducing the quantity of federal prison litigation. In a case
where a judge and the institutional defendants might have been inclined to address
the proven inadequacies of a prison's law library, or medical care delivery system,
for example, by working out one consent decree, the court will now be required to
deal narrowly with each individual problem that arises, prisoner by prisoner. Individual prisoners will not have standing to raise general problems. This is a prescription for increased litigation. In addition, while the issuance of prospective relief is a
matter for the judge alone, claims for individual violations, which inmates will be
encouraged to bring if they cannot hope for systemic relief, may entail jury trials. In
these individual actions, prisoners who suffer from conditions that were previously
declared inadequate will be positioned to win damages, and not just injunctive relief.
The price of this form of federalism may be felt in the federal court workload.
240 Furthermore, such an order may only be issued by a three-judge court. 18
U.S.C. § 3626(a)(3).
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under the "new" standard. In short, the very existence of the
legislation propagates myths.
Termination of Prospective Relief

b.

The PLRA's more meaningful constraints on federal equitable
power are temporal. Under the new provisions, defendants in
prison actions are entitled to request that previously granted prospective relief be terminated according to a time schedule," 1 unless the order was entered without the required findings, 242 in
which case defendants are entitled to immediate termination.2 4 3
To deny the motion for termination of relief, the court must
make written findings like those required by section (a),
above. 2 " These provisions aim to ensure that relief remains narrowly tailored to what is necessary to redress federal violations.24 ' Finally, if defendants have moved for termination of
relief, relief is automatically stayed thirty days after the filing of
such a motion, if the court has not yet entered the required
findings.2 4 6
The above provisions have been of greatest concern to the
courts, because they concern the power of the courts themselves,
not just of prisoner litigants.24 7 Nevertheless, the automatic stay
provisions have been upheld, 248 and the termination provisions
have been upheld by almost all of the courts of appeals that have
considered the question.2 4 9
241 Relief is terminable two years after the date the court granted or approved the
relief, one year after the court has entered an order denying termination of relief, or,
for relief issued on or before the date of enactment of the PLRA, two years after the
date of enactment. Id. § 3626(b)(1)(A).
242

Id.

§ 3626(a).

18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2). The Act also provides that preliminary relief is to expire in 90 days unless relief is made final within that time period. Id. § 3626(a)(2).
244 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(3). This section covers consent decrees as well as injunctions. Id. §§ 3626(g)(7) & (g)(9).
245 See H.R. REP. No. 104-21 at 24 n.2, 25-26 (1995).
243

246

18 U.S.C. § 3626(e)(2).

One separation of powers argument is based in part on the holdings in Plaut v.
Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (Congress may not reopen the final judgments of Article III courts by providing for reinstatement of cases the courts have
dismissed after changing the applicable limitation period), and another in United
States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871) (Congress may not prescribe rules of
decision for the Article III courts).
248 Hadix v. Johnson, 144 F.3d 925 (6th Cir. 1998).
249 See Hadix v. Johnson, 133 F.3d 940, 942-43 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct.
2368 (1998); Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Rouse, 129 F.3d 649 (1st Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2366 (1998); Gavin v. Branstad, 122 F.3d 1081 (8th Cir. 1997),
247
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Here too, it is questionable whether Congress needed to go
out on a constitutional limb to ensure that decrees in prison cases
could be reopened if ongoing relief became unnecessary. The
Supreme Court had already held that if changes in factual conditions make compliance with a consent decree substantially more
onerous, defendants may be granted modification of the decree.2 50 Congress nevertheless issued the Supreme Court a challenge, which, with the current split among the Circuits, the Court
may be considering soon.
5.

The Constitutionality of the PLRA

It would be surprising if the Supreme Court did not agree with
the majority of the courts of appeals that the provisions of the
PLRA are constitutional. The separation of powers challenge to
the termination provisions probably has the best chance of inspiring indignant opinions, as in City of Boerne v. Flores, where
the Court protected judicial prerogative. An equal protection argument, however, based on the fact that the PLRA treats prisoners so differently from other litigants, is not likely to be received
any more sympathetically than it was by the courts of appeals.
At the all-important fork of selecting the appropriate standard
of review, the courts of appeals unanimously concluded that
strict scrutiny was inappropriate, because the termination provisions did not limit the right of access to the courts as narrowly
defined in Lewis v. Casey.251 That being accomplished, the
courts easily accepted Congress's desire to disentangle the federal judiciary from prison administration as rational, and did not
ask questions about whether that goal could have been approached with more narrow provisions that did not single out
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2374 (1998); Dougan v. Singletary, 129 F.3d 1424 (11th Cir.
1997) (all rejecting a range of constitutional challenges to the termination provisions); Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1277
(1997). Only the Ninth Circuit has found these provisions unconstitutional. See
Taylor v. United States, 143 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 1998), affd on narrower ground,
Nos. 97-16069, 97-16071, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 13405 (9th Cir. June 18, 1999) (affirmed on ground that the order terminated had been a final judgment). The Second
Circuit upheld the termination provisions, but only by adopting a narrowing construction the Ninth Circuit believed inconsistent with the legislative history. See
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 124 F.3d 162 (1997), vacated and remanded on reh'g en banc,

1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5130, at *1 (2d Cir. 1999).
250 See supra text accompanying note 97.
251 See, e.g., Gavin, 122 F.3d at 1090; Plyler, 100 F.3d at 373; Benjamin, 124 F.3d
at 174.
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prisoners. One court distinguished Romer v. Evans252 on the
theory that in that case, a distinct group was excluded from all
three branches of political process, whereas the PLRA only limits prisoners' ability to receive full remedial attention from ihe
federal courts. 253 Another court explained that because the
PLRA has such a clear rational basis in legitimate aims of Congress (as to the federal courts' role), it is therefore not based on
"animus" against a particular group, as was the case in Romer.2 5 4
Thus the court avoided confronting the question of whether it
would in fact be acceptable to act with animus toward prisoners.
It is also likely that the Supreme Court will share the attitude
of most lower courts as to the provisions hindering individual
prisoners in their efforts to receive the attention of the federal
courts. Some of these provisions may actually prevent some prisoners from bringing non-frivolous claims pertaining to prison
conditions, and thus would substantially burden the rights within
the core of Casey. The question remains of whether the Court
will apply strict scrutiny even to these claims,25 5 or whether the
Court will adopt the Turner v. Safley accommodationist approach allowing a more diluted balancing, even of a prisoner's
right of access to the courts, and an uncritical acceptance of Congress's justifications. Casey's cavalier treatment, in dicta, of prisoners' access claims does not suggest that the Court will ask hard
questions about Congress's decisions in the PLRA.
Under strict scrutiny, many of the provisions described above
could easily be found not narrowly tailored enough to meet Congress's ostensible goal of reducing frivolous litigation. In fact, it
is arguable that some provisions should not even survive rational
basis scrutiny.2 56 The many provisions described above that go
beyond targeting frivolous claims (for example, keeping indigent
litigants from filing claims regardless of their merits) 257 seem un517 U.S. 620 (1996).
See Benjamin, 124 F.3d at 175.
See Gavin, 122 F.3d at 1090.
255 See cases described in supra notes 218 and 228 for a discussion of whether to
apply strict scrutiny.
256 See The Least Among Us, supra note 215, at 138-43 (some provisions are so
sloppily tailored that they should not even survive rational basis review). Whether
there were less restrictive means by which Congress might have served its legitimate
goals of cutting down the amount of time frivolous litigation consumes in the federal
courts will be discussed in Part III, along with an analysis of how great a problem
frivolous litigation actually is for the federal courts.
257 Although most provisions refuse to subsidize claims prisoners might bring and
252
253
254
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able to even pass the test of serving a legitimate goal. It hardly
seems legitimate to prevent a prisoner who might have a nonfrivolous claim from litigating that claim simply because that prisoner is a member of a group of people who often file frivolous
claims. These provisions disadvantage an individual solely because of that individual's identity as a member of a disfavored
group. The PLRA certainly exhibits animus to prisoner-plaintiffs
in the individual cases, and thus Romer is not really distinguishable-unless, of course, this expression of animus toward prisoners is permissible as part of their punishment.
The idea that limiting individual actions might not be an important inroad upon a prisoner's ability to redress grievances because only one out of three branches of the federal government
is made unavailable ignores the fact that, historically, prisoners
have been most successful in the least political arena--the federal
courts. The breadth of injury to prisoners, whose ability to raise
a range of rights claims in federal court has been their principal
protection against mistreatment, is fully comparable to the denial
of access to the political forum in Romer. Prisoners, unlike the
plaintiffs in Romer, cannot even vote for executive or legislative
officials in some states. As the discussion in Part I showed, however, the Supreme Court has been loath to cast questions about
prisoners' rights in terms of equal protection, preferring to simply assume that prisoners are different. After the PLRA, they
are indeed treated differently.
E.

The Consequences of the PLRA

It is too soon to tell what impact Congress's efforts have had or
will have on the number of prisoner cases fied in federal
court. 258 Even if the overall number of petitions filed is reduced,
there is no way to tell whether the unfiled cases would have been
frivolous, or whether it is only the indigent who are being prevented or deterred from filing cases, whether frivolous or not.
thus arguably are merely refusing to confer governmental largess, even largess must
be distributed consistently with equal protection principles.
258 Initial figures indicate that filings after the PLRA are down, although it is hard
to measure cause and effect or to project longer term figures. See ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS,
1997 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 132 [hereinafter 1997 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE RE-

PORT] (prisoner civil rights petitions filed in federal court went down 30.5%, from
41,215 during the year ending September 30, 1996, to 28,635 during the year ending
September 30, 1997).
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Many of the PLRA provisions eliminate meritorious claims along
with the frivolous, single out particular categories of prisoners for
different treatment, and prevent, or at least deter, indigent prisoners from litigating claims a more affluent prisoner would be
able to litigate. It is also too soon to tell whether there has been
or will be any corresponding change in prison conditions, as the
prisons more frequently fall outside the range of the vision of the
federal courts.
Shortly after passage of the PLRA, Congress held oversight
hearings to ensure that the Department of Justice, under the aegis of President Clinton, who had initially used his veto on the
Budget Act (although not because of the PLRA provisions),
would implement its new product zealously. 9 One of the Senate's complaints was that the Clinton Justice Department continued to use its authority under the Civil Rights of Institutionalized
Persons Act to file pro-plaintiff briefs in prison cases. 260 Recalling how an earlier Congress found itself defeated by the Reagan
Department of Justice decision not to use its litigation authority
under CRIPA,2 6 ' it once again appears that the ratchet under
which Congress is operating only goes in one direction-toward
the bottom.
III
PRISON LITIGATION AND THE FEDERAL COURTS:
MYTH AND REALITY

A.

Defining the Problem

As noted above, in enacting the PLRA provisions restricting
access to the courts by individual prisoner litigants, Congress did
not purport to be making a policy statement about who prisoners
are and how they may be punished. The legislation was not justified expressly by invocation of a new retributive ideal. Congress
claimed to be saving the federal courts from drowning in a sea of
frivolous prisoner petitions-a claim that may be empirically difficult to prove. However, Congress did not even try to establish
the need for, nor the effect of its solutions. Congress bypassed
259

See, e.g., 142

CONG.

REC. S10,576-02 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1996) (statement of

Senator Abraham) (including account of presidential veto).
260 See id. at S10,577 (complaining that the Clinton Department of Justice continued to file briefs in prison cases under CRIPA, even after the PLRA).
261 See supra text accompanying note 169.
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usual processes in connection with the PLRA, 262 and consequently the Act is based on the assumption that prisoners are
overwhelming the federal courts with frivolous litigation, and the
hope that the adopted measures would help. Congress shared
this assumption with the public, which had already been schooled
to believe that prison litigation, rather than prisons themselves,
needed reform.
Prisoners unquestionably bring many actions in the federal
courts. People incarcerated because of a criminal conviction are,
of course, highly motivated to bring habeas corpus petitions challenging their convictions and therefore their custody. 263 It is
equally unsurprising that prisoners bring many cases about
prison conditions in federal court. Indeed, owing to the nature of
the punishment of incarceration, virtually every tort or small
claims action a non-incarcerated person might raise in state
court, is, for a prisoner, a dispute with the state. As the Supreme
Court itself has commented, "[w]hat for a private citizen would
be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his tailor,
with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the prisoner, a
dispute with the State. '' 2 4 In a rights-oriented society, when the
state punishes by retraction of rights, litigation about the degree
of retraction of those rights may be inevitable.
Statistics on the volume of prison litigation in federal courts
may be described in many ways. One concrete statistic has documented the growth in the federal court prison docket. During
the 1960s and 70s, as the federal courts rejected the hands-off
doctrine and created rights and remedies for prisoners, the
number of complaints filed grew exponentially.2 65 From 1980 to
1996, the absolute number of claims filed continued to grow,
nearly tripling.2 66 Of course, during that same period, the prison
population more than tripled, and thus the filing rate per prisoner actually decreased by seventeen percent.2 6 7 The increase in
262 See supra note 195-98.
263 During the year ending September 30, 1997, for example, state prisoners filed
21,858 habeas corpus petitions, and federal prisoners filed 11,675 motions to vacate
sentence. 1997 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 258, at 129.
264 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492 (1973).
265 In 1966, the first year for which the federal courts reported this statistic, prisoners filed 218 civil rights claims. By 1980, that number had grown to 12,395 claims
(filed by state prisoners). ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT (1980).
266 1997 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 258, at tbl. C-2 (state pris-

oner civil rights claims filed numbered 12,395 in 1980 and 39,996 in 1996).
267 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

PRIS-
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prison litigation is attributable to increased use of incarceration,
not only to the courts' early welcome.
Because the volume of prison litigation is large, it could be said
that prison cases represent a hefty percentage of the federal
docket.268 While this is true in terms of numbers of cases, the
prison cases do not consume nearly a proportionate share of the
federal courts' time. The number of hours actually spent on each
prisoner petition is not tracked by the Administrative Office,2 69
but prisoner petitions rarely go to trial or even to hearings,27 °

and are generally screened and summarily dismissed at early
stages of the proceedings. 2 71 The authors of several empirical
studies have concluded that it is misleading to speak of prisoner

civil rights petitions as burdening the federal courts, despite their
numbers.2 7 2
The frequent dismissal of prison petitions might seem to support Congress's other assumption-that most prisoner complaints are frivolous. To some extent, however, frivolity is a selfCOURTS, 1980-96 1(1997) (rate of petitions filed
dropped from 72.7 petitions per 1,000 inmates to 60.5).
268 In the year ending September 30, 1997, for example, state prisoner civil rights
petitions accounted for approximately ten percent of the number of civil cases filed
in federal district courts. 1997 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 258, at
128-29.

ONER PETITIONS IN THE FEDERAL

269 Statistics are kept on how long cases remain on the federal court docket, and
here, prison cases may be about average, see Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983:
Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 532-33

(1982) [hereinafter T. Eisenberg], but this figure does not reveal how many hours
during
that period were actually spent on each case.
2 70
See 1997 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 258, at 152 (0.5 percent of prisoner civil rights petitions went to trial); id. at 355 (in proceedings before
magistrate judges, hearings were held in 867 prisoner civil rights proceedings, out of
16,480 cases handled, see id. at 351); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM 228-29 tbl. 7.4 (1996). Prison cases also tend to consume
less than their proportionate share of time on appeal. See id. at 231.
271 See Turner, supra note 204, at 637. Professor Eisenberg, in fact, thought the

statistics suggested that the federal courts were not reading prisoner petitions sympathetically enough. See T. Eisenberg, supra note 269, at 544.
272 T. Eisenberg, supra note 269, at 524, 530. See also Thrner, supra note 204, at
637 (the "impact of prisoner section 1983 cases on the efficient functioning of the
federal district courts is not nearly as great as the numbers might indicate"). Recommended procedures for handling prisoner petitions include screening by staff attorneys, who develop expertise in identifying when a pro se complaint states a
cognizable claim. See

FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES

FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIoHrs CASES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

(1980).

Screening procedures certainly represent a less restrictive means of handling frivolous petitions than does completely discouraging indigent inmates from filing claims.
Congress made little effort to determine whether the courts' screening procedures
already had the situation under control.
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fulfilling category. As the Supreme Court narrows the definition
of rights and raises the procedural hurdles for relief, prisoners
are bound to lose more cases. A growing number of complaints
fail to state a claim on which relief can be granted, simply because the courts are less willing to grant relief on those claims.
This result does not necessarily mean that the claims are unworthy, but only that they are unsuccessful.2 73 Those losing claims
may now include a religious inmate's claim for a kosher diet or
the right to keep a rosary-claims that Congress itself had recently found compelling.2 7 4
Even if Congress had looked carefully at the facts, in all likelihood the PLRA still would have been enacted because it is based
not on facts, but on value judgments. To illustrate, if we were to
assume that five percent of prisoner petitions prevail and thus
are presumably meritorious, and we then identified how much
time courts had spent in screening other cases and considering
that five percent, would we conclude that the courts were wasting
their time, or that they were doing a difficult and necessary job?
In other words, the question is how much time is too much time
for courts to spend on these cases. This judgment may depend
on the focus of the question. If the focus is on the five percent of
cases, and the evaluator is aware that those prevailing cases
sometimes protected prisoners against disease, gang rape, and
guard brutality, the time seems well spent. However, if the focus
is on the 95% of cases dismissed, and it is assumed they were forthe most part about nothing more serious than peanut butter, the
time instead may seem wasted.
B.

The Myth of Prison Litigation

In the absence of hearings, the PLRA Congress focused on
anecdote 2 75-the colorful, reassuringly trivial cases that anyone
would agree should be dismissed. There was no testimony or discussion about gang rape in prison, or on the dangers of over273 The Court itself has declined to equate failure to state a claim on which relief
can be granted with "frivolity" within the meaning of the forma pauperis statute.

See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 329-31 (1989); see also Stephen M. Feldman,
Indigents in the Federal Courts: The In Forma PauperisStatute-Equality and Frivol-

ity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413, 415 & n.14 (1985) (on the variety of judicial definitions of frivolity).
See discussion supra Part II.C.
See, e.g., supra note 194 (Senator Dole on peanut butter); see also supra note
176 (enatcr Hatch on the need for nrotecton -f religious freedom comnared to
suits about peanut butter).
274

275
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crowding and the spread of tuberculosis, but there was talk about
peanut butter. The history of the peanut butter story is instructive, for it reveals a distortion in the way the public gets information from the media, the Supreme Court, and even from the
scholarly press. The public's beliefs then become political reality
for elected officials.
1.

The Media and the Myth of Peanut Butter

The media have participated, perhaps unintentionally, in a
public disinformation campaign, partly at the behest of the state
officials who defend prisoner lawsuits. As Second Circuit Judge
Jon Newman said:2 76
[1]aboring under the burdens of having to respond to
thousands of lawsuits, most of which are frivolous, the attorneys general of the states adopted the tactic of condemning all
prisoner litigation as frivolous. Their national association canvassed the attorneys general for their lists of top ten frivolous
prisoner lawsuits and widely
27 disseminated to the press the lists
the association collected.
The eye-catching cases presented as "typical" included an inmate
who allegedly sued because his prison had no salad bars or
brunches on weekends or holidays; a prisoner who allegedly sued
New York State because his towels were white instead of his preferred beige; and finally, and most infamously, an inmate who
was said to have claimed cruel and unusual punishment because
he received one jar of chunky and one jar of creamy peanut butter after ordering two jars of chunky peanut butter from the
prison canteen.2 7 8
Anyone familiar with prison litigation would have several reactions to these examples. First, even if these cases were "typical,"
federal judges are not often tempted to issue injunctive relief or
award damages to inmates who are aesthetically displeased with
the color of their towels. Second, these examples do not fairly
reflect the range of claims that command the attention of federal
judges. The attorneys general, who represent one side in adver276 See Jon 0. Newman, Pro Se PrisonerLitigation: Looking for Needles in Hays-

tacks, 62 BROOK. L. REv. 519 (1996).
277 Id. at 520; (citing Attorneys General Seek to Curtail Frivolous Inmate Lawsuits; Call Upon U.S. Congress, States Legislatures to Respond, News release, Nat'l
Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., Washington, D.C. (Aug. 1, 1995)).
278 See Dennis C. Vacco et al., Letter to the Editor, Free the Courtsfrom Frivolous
Prisoner Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1995, at A26.
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sarial proceedings, are not anxious to remind the public that the
prison cases they actually spend time trying are more likely to
involve complaints about gang rape and the spread of tuberculosis, than the spread of peanut butter.2 7 9
Judge Newman researched the cited cases and discovered that
in addition to being misleading, the much-publicized descriptions
of the selected cases were sometimes "simply false., 28 0 The
"salad bar" allegation was an ancillary, exemplary point included
in a twenty-seven page complaint alleging dangerously unhealthy
prison conditions, including food contaminated by rodents, lack
of ventilation, and forced confinement of prisoners with contagious diseases. 281 The "beige towel" complaint actually claimed
that the prison had confiscated towels (which happened to be
beige) and a jacket that the prisoner's family had sent him and
then improperly disciplined the prisoner for receiving the package.28 2 The notorious peanut butter case involved a complaint
that prison officials had continued to improperly deduct money
from the prisoner's account for a jar of peanut butter that he had
been permitted to return when the canteen officials conceded
that it was not what he had ordered.28 3 This may not seem like a
weighty matter, but it is an understandable complaint given that
the price of a jar of peanut butter may represent about two
weeks of an average prisoner's income."
The attorney general letter was considered "news" because
public figures can call press conferences or issue press releases
that actually get read. The media do not frequently consider
prisoner complaints of unfair treatment to be newsworthy. The
news about prisoners' complaints thus tends to be one-sided.
This situation feeds on itself; as prisoners are perceived as unduly
magnifying petty grievances, the news media become even less
interested in their complaints, except in the occasional sensa279 See, e.g., Harris v. Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1991)(on treatment of
HIV positive inmates); Austin v. Lehman, No. CIV.A.90-7497, 1992 WL 277511, at
*1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 29, 1992) (requiring prison to institute procedures to avoid spread
of tuberculosis).
280 Newman, supra note 276, at 520.
281 Tyler v. Carnahan, No. 4 94 CV 0017WSB (E.D. Mo., filed Dec. 17, 1993).
282 Rivera v. State, No. 90811 (N.Y. Ct. Cl., filed Dec. 21, 1994).
283 Newman, supra note 276, at 521.
284 A prisoner's salary generally amounts to no more than a few dollars a day. See
The Lnvt .4mon !A, supra note 215. at 138 nn.112-13 (on the size of prisoner's
salaries and bank accounts).
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tional case. In publicity as in rights, the ratchet only seems to go
one way.
The isolation of the prisons is also an important factor contributing to the public's ignorance of the number of serious problems
in the prisons. Prisons tend to be physically isolated and difficult
to reach, and it is therefore easy for the public to remain unaware of what is happening inside. Prison security, as well as isolation, can make it difficult for journalists to see first-hand what
is happening. The Supreme Court has also contributed to the
difficulty, with case law supporting the right of prison administrators to limit the media's access to prisons and their inmates. 8 5
In the peanut butter case, journalists allowed themselves to be
misled, and simply passed along information from press releases.
The attorneys general had cannily selected colorful sound bites
of facts from lengthy, tedious legal documents. Reporters apparently did not investigate whether the characterizations of this litigation were misleading or untrue. In fact, the only fact checking
done, significantly after the fact, was by a federal judge who explained his findings to the vastly smaller audience of a law review
article. 86
2.

The Supreme Court and Frivolity

In a solitary dissent in Cruz v. Beto,287 the case of a Buddhist
claiming the right to practice his religion while incarcerated, now
Chief Justice Rehnquist chastised the majority for taking this
claim seriously, announcing that he, unlike eight other Justices,
would have dismissed the complaint as "frivolous. '2 88 Justice
Rehnquist now commands a majority on the Court in many
prison cases, and can often give his own definition to "frivolity."
If the Supreme Court, the guardian of our countermajoritarian
traditions, declares claims like the right to practice one's religion
to be frivolous, it is unlikely the public will disagree. The moral
285 See supra note 85. Foucault suggests that the isolation of the prison and the
invisibility of what happens within the prison are essential to the true function of the
prison, and not just a manifestation of the need for prison security. Invisible punishment replaced the public "spectacle of the scaffold," leading the public to associate
the exclusion of prisoners with the exclusion of lepers, and thus creating an isolated
locus for delinquency. FOUCAULT, supra note 19, at 35-69, 124-26, 195-201, 236-239.
Rather than failing at reforming prisoners, the prison can then be regarded as succeeding in breeding and isolating delinquency. Id. at 277-92.
286 See supra note 276.
287 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam); see supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
288 Cruz, 405 U.S. at 329.
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authority with which the Warren Court, and even the Burger
Court, spoke about the importance of enforcing the rights of the
unpopular is gone.
The Court's rhetoric as well as results in the most recent cases
further encourage the view that prisoners' claims only rarely deserve serious attention. In Sandin v. Conner,289 for example, the
Court was asked to consider a prisoner's claim that he had been
unfairly punished by being sentenced to a punitive housing unit
for thirty days without an adequate hearing. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in describing the procedural due process claims plaguing
the courts, chose instead to emphasize cases involving far pettier
claims than Conner's: one inmate's claim of entitlement to a tray
rather than a sack lunch, and another's demand for an electrical
outlet in his cell. 29° The majority did not mention the more serious claims that the new restrictive test would foreclose. Nor did
the majority point out that trivial claims about sack lunches do
not tend to prevail, or to consume much judicial time. The fact
that Conner, like most prisoner litigants in the Supreme Court
recently, lost his case, also sends a message that prison claims
need not be taken seriously.
C.

The View from the Law Reviews

The prisoners' rights revolution, with its many cases and
skirmishes, was grist for the scholarly press. Articles on particular cases, particular rights, and prisoners' rights in general,
abounded. During the 1970s and 80s, most legal commentators
commended the courts for decisions enhancing prisoners' rights
and criticized the Supreme Court's backlash.2 91
There has been backlash in the law reviews too. In the 1990s,
fewer pages of the law reviews have been devoted to prisoner
cases, and most of what is written is by student authors. The student authors who discuss recent Supreme Court cases and the
PLRA are typically critical of cutbacks in rights,29 2 but an inSee discussion supra Part I.B.4.a.
See supra notes 125-26. As in the cases Judge Newman investigated, the characterizations of the claims raised were somewhat misleading. See supra notes 12526.
291 Note, Creatures,Persons and Prisoners: Evaluating Prison Conditions Under
the Eighth Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1099 (1982); Robbins, supra note 36, at
213-15.
292 Student authors' commentary on the case of Sandin v. Conner generally criticize the Court for being insufficiently sympathetic to prisoners' claims that they are
being treated arbitrarily. See, e.g., Philip W. Sbaratta, Note, Sandin v. Conner: The
289
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creasing number accepts as gospel that there is a need to take
drastic measures to save the federal courts from drowning in a
sea of prison litigation.2 9 3

In every context, voices willing to challenge the current conventional wisdom have become rare.
CONCLUSION

Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has raced all the way

to the bottom.

Prisoners do still have Eighth Amendment

rights, and some bits of other constitutional rights as well. But
the downward momentum is alarming. The Court, in service of
its idea of federal modesty, has cut prisoners' rights, and invalidated Congress's attempt, in RFRA, to expand those rights.

Congress, ostensibly out of concern for the courts or for federalism but fundamentally out of a belief that prisoners are not worSupreme Court's Narrowing of Prisoners'Due Process and the Missed Opportunity
to Discover True Liberty, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 744, 767, 772, 775 (1996) (Conner
reduced prisoners' due process rights and protection against arbitrary treatment to
an unacceptable level); John K. Edwards, Note, A Prisoner's Threshold for Procedural Due Process After Sandin v. Conner: Conservative Activism or Legitimate
Compromise?, 33 HouSTON L. REv. 1521 (1997); Julia M. Glencer, Comment, An
"Atypical and Significant" Barrier to Prisoners' Procedural Due Process Claims
Based on State-Created Liberty Interests, 100 DIcK. L. REV. 861, 907, 914 (1996)
(Supreme Court is leaving prisoners without adequate protection against arbitrariness); Deborah R. Stagner, Note, Sandin v. Conner: Redefining State Prisoners'Liberty Interest and Due Process Rights, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1761, 1781-82 (1996) (without
federal court protection, prisoners will be subject to a wide range of serious actions
without recourse); Michelle C. Ciszak, Sandin v. Conner: Locking Out Prisoners'
Due Process Claims, 45 CATH. U. L. REV. 1101, 1144-45 (1996) (effectively eliminating federal forum for redress "locks out" judicial review).
The authors also criticized the Court for writing an ambiguous opinion that gave
insufficient guidance to the lower courts. See, e.g., Prisoners Rights-Punishments
Imposed by Administrative Proceedings, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 146 (1995)
(describing Conner as "fraught with ambiguity"); Scott F. Weisman, Note, Sandin v.
Conner: Lowering the Boom on the ProceduralRights of Prisoners, 46 Am. U. L.
REV. 897, 919 (1997); Ciszak, supra, at 1139; Quan Luong, Note, Sandin v. Conner:
Prisoners' Rights and State-Created Liberty Interests-Has the Court Come Full Circle?, 7 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 25, 27 (1997); Edwards, supra, at 1559.
Most of the smaller number of student authors who wrote on the PLRA thought
some of its provisions were unconstitutional or unwise. See Schonenberger, supra
note 228; The Least Among Us, supra note 204; see also Catherine G. Patsos, The
Constitutionality and Implications of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. REV. 205 (1998); Jennifer A. Puplava, Note, Peanut Butter and Politics: An
Evaluation of the Separation-of-PowersIssues in Section 802 of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 73 IND. L.J. 329 (1997).
293 See, e.g., Kristin L. Burns, Note, Return to Hard Time: The Prison Litigation
Reform Act, 31 GA. L. REV. 879, 925 (1997) (measures like this are necessary to
control frivolous litigation, and are "consistent with the temper of the times").
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thy of the courts' time, has been cutting prisoners' access to the
federal courts, making it difficult for them to raise even those
claims the Supreme Court has left extant. The Court, in turn,
seems more likely to hear Congress's message in the PLRA and
uphold the draconian measures designed to keep prisoners out of
court, than to heed the message of RFRA and revise its own disdainful treatment of prisoners' religion claims.
What does this story tell us about rights, and about judge-made
law as an instrument for social change? When scholars debate
the efficacy of judicial declaration of rights as a means of promoting the interests of the politically powerless, the debate, like Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's moot discussion of the abortion
cases,2 94 sometimes centers on whether the Court can effectively
take the lead, or whether social acceptance must grow outside
the courts before rights can truly be won. The Warren Court, in
assuming responsibility for assuring prisoners a right of access to
the federal courts, believed that prisoners, like its other disempowered constituents, needed rights and were unlikely to win
them except in the federal courts. Subsequent developments
show that without public acceptance, rights, even those once protected in federal court, dissipate-under assault from Congress,
the Court, or both. In light of the one-sided information the public receives, however, it would be surprising if any amount of
time were to generate so much public sympathy with the plight of
prisoners in cases like Turner v. Safley (inmate-to-inmate correspondence), Sandin v. Conner (arbitrary punishment within a
prison) and Lewis v. Casey (lack of legal research tools), that
these prisoners would find their concerns honored without federal judicial involvement.
Will the Court continue to lower the floor of protection for
prisoners? If the public in a particular state supports the
reemergence of the chain gang school of incarceration, might the
Court hold that rights generated under a rehabilitative philosophy may now be retracted upon conviction, if that is how the
voters choose to define being a prisoner? Would the Court allow
infliction of arbitrary punishment, arbitrary denial of religious
worship, or arbitrary denial of access to the courts to become the
new punishment? If the federal courts did tolerate such extreme
294 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185,

1205-08 (1992) (Supreme Court's abortion rulings did not invite "dialogue" with legislatures, and halted political process apparently moving in the direction of reform).
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views, would Congress, in light of City of Boerne v. Flores, be
able to find a way to set a higher floor of federal protection?
As long as the Supreme Court continues its current course of
compromise, prisoners will retain some federally guaranteed
rights, regardless of what theory of punishment gains ascendancy.
But there is even less ambivalence about prison litigation than
there is about prisoners, both on and off the Court. The
Supreme Court and Congress, along with the public, seem to believe that prison litigation is fair game for radical reconstruction-that prisoners get more than their proper share of federal
court time. The recent measures taken by Congress, and to some
extent by the Court, may succeed in reducing the volume of
prison litigation, but they do so at the cost of preventing or discouraging claims that are valid even under the Court's newly demanding standards, by discriminating against indigent prisoners,
and by underdefining the right of access to the courts itself.
If the Supreme Court continues to guard its turf as jealously as
it did in Flores, only the Court can remedy the increasing discrimination against prisoner-litigants in federal court. Of course,
the Court can and probably will respond, "let them go to state
court."2'95 Under the circumstances, it remains to be seen
whether that sentiment will end up sounding like Marie
Antoinette.

295 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362 (1953) (concluding
that state courts are the ultimate protectors of federal constitutional liberties).
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